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Abstract
Built on the foundation of economic principles, real estate offers many pursuits of academic
discovery within the realm of finance. This dissertation examines three areas of real estate
finance. In the first chapter, I use the unique real estate characteristics of heterogeneity,
immobility, and localized markets to examine the spatial aspects of large-scale commercial real
estate portfolios. The results demonstrate a clear need for portfolio managers to diversify
properties based upon distances between properties. The second chapter examines another largescale real estate portfolio, the real estate investment trust, which is held by investors seeking
dividend income. Despite the importance of dividend payouts to investors, current real estate
literature does not fully explain the dividend policy of REITs. I find that REITs base dividend
payouts on contemporaneous earnings, the level of dividends paid last period, and firm volatility.
For real estate investors that desire income based upon debt instruments, the last chapter
examines the prepayment and default of mortgage instruments using credit scoring. I address the
research question of how credit scoring affects mortgage pricing. The findings indicate a need to
include credit scores as a state variable in a mortgage option pricing model. Overall, each
chapter furthers our understanding of real estate finance.
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1. Introduction
Nongovernment real estate is a $22 trillion asset category, which exceeds the size of other
common asset categories such as corporate equities (13 trillion), government debt (7 trillion),
and mortgage debt (8 trillion). The magnitude of the market offers numerous avenues for real
estate research. I explore three in this dissertation.
The first essay examines the spatial component of commercial real estate portfolio risk.
Commercial properties exhibit spatial correlation when properties are located in close proximity
to one another. I find that separation distance between properties is important within
metropolitan submarkets. Further, when I control for the rural regions inherent in a U.S. national
study, I find statistically significant positive autocorrelation in 12 of 15 Consolidated
Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Overall, the results in the first chapter demonstrate that
commercial real estate portfolio should consider the spatial correlation of properties held within
a Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
The second chapter addresses questions about agency costs, dividend policies, and dividend
smoothing in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Two papers frame much of the general
understanding of dividend payouts by REITs. The REIT is a unique organizational structure
because tax law requires 90 percent of taxable earnings must be paid to shareholders. Our
current understanding is that REITs show a negative correlation between the return on assets
ratio and dividend payout. The amount of debt versus total company assets is also explanatory in
explaining dividend policy. I find that REITs exhibit correlations between dividend policy and
proxies for agency costs and asymmetric information when simultaneity is a concern. By
controlling for endogeneity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity, I find that the dividend
policy of REITs is dictated by contemporaneous earnings, the level of dividends paid last period,
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and a proxy for firm volatility. These findings coincide with discussion in the literature
regarding the many favorable REIT attributes that control for market imperfections.
The last essay investigates credit scoring in mortgages. Credit scores are instrumental in
lenders' decisions concerning mortgage accessibility and interest rate levels. To date, mortgage
pricing models structure credit scores as a transaction cost or friction in the market. I posit that
credit scores are a competing transaction cost, which means that a change in a borrower's credit
score affects both the prepayment and default options of a mortgage. This leads to changes in
the pricing of the mortgage.
Overall, real estate offers many facets of academic discovery. Built on economic and finance
understanding, real estate offers uniqueness within the finance field due to heterogeneous
products that are immobile and localized. I examine these specific elements in the next section
regarding real estate portfolios.

2

2. Real Estate Portfolios
Modern portfolio theory, as pioneered by Markowitz (1952), demonstrates that diversification
can increase the return for a given variance or reduce the risk for a given return. Further,
individual investors can diversify their own portfolios to generate the desired return for a
preferred risk in perfect capital markets. Portfolio managers have no advantage in providing
diversification in the absence of restrictions and bankruptcy costs.
Diversification of a portfolio that directly owns real estate assets, however, is more complex.
Institutions and pension funds have been making direct real estate investments for decades due to
depreciation and tax benefits, low volatility, and income generation. But real estate portfolio
managers face a trade-off. On one hand, due to the local nature of real estate, a portfolio
manager will want to specialize within a market or region. By specializing, a manager can
become an expert in the local market and reduce search and on-going portfolio costs. On the
other hand, due to the immobility of land, diversification of a real estate portfolio requires
investments across diverse markets. By holding multiple properties within a submarket or
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), real estate portfolios will experience a correlation of
property returns due to a lack of distance between the holdings. Neighboring properties will
experience similar supply and demand conditions, property tax regimes, labor markets, as well as
zoning laws.
In this study, I examine the spatial component of commercial real estate portfolios by joining
portfolio theory with the tools of spatial econometrics. While previous studies have identified
the importance of geographic diversification within real estate portfolios -- with the regions of
study advancing from four or eight U.S. zones to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to
neighborhoods within a city – the literature does not use spatial tools for systematic examination
of spatial dependence among real estate properties. It is not surprising that nearby properties
3

exhibit a degree of spatial dependence, but research questions exist regarding i) how much initial
spatial correlation is present for adjacent properties, especially for different commercial property
types since diversification by property type is effective is other real estate diversification studies;
ii) how quickly does the spatial correlation decay; and iii) at what distance does the spatial
correlation decay to zero. The last question is of particular importance since zero spatial
correlation implies mitigation of spatial portfolio risk.
To address the research questions, I employ spatial econometric methods to measure
correlations of property attributes as a function of the distance between the properties. The
results demonstrate significant spatial correlations for properties separated from 0 to 40 miles.
Overall, commercial real estate exhibits significant spatial correlation within MSAs and across
multiple MSAs that are within a larger metropolitan region. Portfolio diversification by property
type is helpful in reducing the spatial correlation, however, the effect is minimal if the location of
the properties is within the same or adjacent zip codes.
In general, the distance to reach random spatial correlation coincides roughly with the
diameter of many MSAs. The empirical results and subsequent simulations imply a sufficient
condition of building a commercial real estate portfolio is a strategy that holds one property per
MSA or Consolidated MSA (CMSA). Owning different types of property within an MSA
reduces correlation, but not fully. Also, adding more properties within an MSA is not
particularly helpful. Unlike Fama (1976), where the portfolio standard deviation of an equally
weighted portfolio of equity securities decays to about zero with a portfolio of fifteen randomly
selected stocks, adding more properties within an MSA or CMSA potentially compounds the
spatial correlation problem. Overall, the results demonstrate a need for portfolio managers to
separate portfolio properties across MSAs.

4

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 discusses previous real estate
diversification studies and applications of spatial techniques in the real estate literature. Section
2.2 examines spatial correlation and portfolio theory. Section 2.3 details the spatial tools for this
study. Section 2.4 presents findings from various commercial property datasets. Section 2.5
details the findings for residential returns. Section 2.6 presents combined commercial and
residential property findings. Section 2.7 applies the empirical results to the portfolio theory in
section 2. Lastly, section 2.8 summarizes this chapter.

2.1 Diversification and Spatial Literature
Diversification of real estate portfolios is the subject of considerable research over the past two
decades. The two predominant paths of analysis are diversification either by property type or by
geographic or economic regions. Initially, Miles and McCue (1982) find that diversification by
property type generates better characteristics than a strategy based upon geographic regions.
Subsequent studies, such as those by Hartzell, Hekman, and Miles (1986), Hartzell, Shulman,
and Wurtzebach (1987), Mueller and Ziering (1992), Mueller (1993), Goetzmann and Wachter
(1995), Williams (1996), Wolverton, Cheng and Hardin (1998), as well as Cheng and Black
(1998), redefine the geographic categories into either more minute areas or based upon economic
strategies such as Standard Industrial Classification groups. Overall, the research establishes that
geographic grouping based upon economic characteristics is dominant over geographic division
based upon political boundaries (e.g., state borders), and smaller regions such as MSAs or
neighborhoods are more appropriate for diversification than four or eight national regions.
Explicit or implicit in these studies is a search for homogeneous regions such that
correlations between regions can be computed to diversify away unsystematic portfolio risk. A
concern with establishing a region ex ante is that real estate functions in a local market, and even
within a small region, such as an MSA, multiple geographic regions may exist that covary to
5

some degree. To address the issue of homogeneous regions, this study measures the correlation
between properties, not as a function of geographic, political, or economic boundaries, but as a
function of separation distance between properties.
The application of separation distance and spatial econometrics is new to commercial real
estate, however, prior use of spatial econometrics is found in the residential market literature.
Dubin (1992) uses a method of spatial prediction on single-family property transactions in
Baltimore to compute house price contours. Can (1992) and Can and Megbolugbe (1997)
examine spatial autocorrelation in house prices by including spatially lagged values of the
response variable in a hedonic model. Basu and Thibodeau (1998) examine spatial correlation in
Dallas house prices and find spatial techniques generally improve OLS. Thibodeau (2003) uses
spatial econometrics to examine the increase in prediction accuracy for within-metropolitan-area
housing submarkets. And more recently, the September, 2004 volume of The Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics presents four papers applying spatial techniques to the housing
market. In general, the importance of spatial econometrics is evolving in the real estate
literature. In the next section, I motivate the use of spatial econometrics within a commercial
real estate portfolio.

2.2 Spatial Correlation and Portfolio Theory
2.2.1 Portfolio Risk
To determine how spatial correlation fits into general portfolio theory, consider a portfolio of N
risky assets. The risk of the portfolio is a function of the variance of each asset and the
covariance between the assets. Assuming that the portfolio is equally weighted such that the
weight, w, of each asset is wi = w j = 1 N , then the portfolio risk or variance, σ p2 , is
N

σ p2 = ∑
i =1

N

1 1
1 N
σ
=
∑
∑
ij
N 2 i =1
j =1 N N
6

N

∑σ
j =1

ij

,

where N is the number of risky assets in the portfolio, and σ ij is the covariance between each
risky asset. By definition, the covariance is

σ ij = σ iσ j ρ (i, j ) ,
where σ iσ j is the product of the standard deviations and ρ (i, j ) is the correlation between
assets i and j. Further, without loss of generality, if I let σ i = σ j = 1 , then the variance of the
portfolio expressed as a function of correlation is

σ p2 =

1
N2

N

N

i =1

j =1
i≠ j

∑ ∑ρ

ij

.

(1)

It follows that as N increases, the portfolio variance approaches the average correlation. Thus,
the risk of a real estate portfolio is a function of the correlations between the properties.

2.2.2 Spatial Source of Portfolio Risk
To better understand the spatial component of the portfolio correlation function, begin with two
risky assets, noting that systematic risk is a measure of how an asset covaries with the economy
and unsystematic risk is independent of the economy. Since the return on any risky asset is a
linear function of the market return plus a random error term, ε , the return generating equations
of two risky assets i and j are
Ri = ai + bi Rm + ε i

and
R j = a j + b j Rm + ε j .

The assumption in portfolio theory is that the error term of a specific risky asset, j, is
independent of the market. This fact implies that COV ( Rm , ε j ) = 0 . Thus, the portfolio risk,
expressed as COV ( Ri , R j ) = Ε( Ri R j ) − Ε( Ri )Ε( R j ) , is

7

COV ( Ri , R j ) = Ε ⎡⎣(ai + bi Rm )(a j + b j Rm ) ⎤⎦ − (ai + bi Ε( Rm ))(a j + b j Ε( Rm ))
= Ε( ai a j + ai b j Rm + a j bi Rm + bi b j Rm2 ) − ( ai a j + ai b j Ε ( Rm ) + a j bi Ε ( Rm ) + bi b j Ε ( Rm ) 2 )

= bi b j ⎡⎣Ε( Rm2 ) − Ε( Rm ) 2 ⎤⎦
= bi b jσ m2 .

(2)

The result is the systematic portion of portfolio risk.
What if the assumption of COV ( Rm , ε j ) = 0 does not hold? Real estate portfolios add
another dimension not found in portfolios consisting of nonspatial financial assets. The spatial
dimension introduces correlation into the random error terms, resulting in the covariance
between two risky properties of
COV ( Ri , R j ) = bi b jσ m2 + bi Ε( Rmε j ) − bi Ε( Rm )Ε (ε j ) + b j Ε ( Rmε i )

−b j Ε( Rm )Ε(ε i ) + Ε(ε iε j ) − Ε(ε i )Ε(ε j )

(3)

Since the differences between equations (2) and (3) are spatially diversifiable, I contend that
the extra terms in equation (3) represent unsystematic risk. The implication for a real estate
portfolio is that properties need to be spaced sufficiently far apart for COV ( Rm , ε j ) = 0 to hold.
To better quantify the intuition of sufficiently separated, the next section examines some spatial
tools to measure the spatial correlation.

2.3 The Variogram and Correlogram
The portion of geostatistics I use for this study focuses on the continuous nature of a series of
return observations yi, i=1,...,N, over a national study region

, the contiguous United States.

The returns are assumed to be observations on a spatial stochastic process {Y ( s ), s ∈
varies in a spatially continuous manner over

and has been sampled at fixed points.
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} , which

Bailey and Gatrell (1995) build a mathematical foundation for the correlogram as follows. If
there exists a spatially stochastic process {Y ( s ), s ∈

} where the expected value of Y (s)

is

µ (s) and VAR [Y ( s ) ] is σ 2 ( s ) then the covariance of this process at any two points si and s j is
defined as

C ( si , s j ) = Ε ⎡⎣(Y ( si ) − µ ( si ))(Y ( s j ) − µ ( s j )) ⎤⎦
with the corresponding correlation defined as

ρ ( si , s j ) =

C ( si , s j )

σ ( si )σ ( s j )

.

A spatially stochastic process is stationary if µ ( s) = µ and σ 2 ( s ) = σ 2 . Stationarity implies
that the distribution of the mean or variance is invariant under translation. Thus, for a spatially
stochastic process, the stationary random function is homogeneous in space. And for any
increment of distance, the distributions of the mean and variance, or any other moments, are
independent of location and constant throughout

.

The distance between the two points si and s j is the simple Euclidean geographic distance,
denoted as h, a (Nx1) column vector. Therefore, the location of any one point is described by xi
and yi coordinates as expressed in latitude and longitude measurements. Thus, two or more
locations can be described by vectors of latitude and longitude values yielding

n(n − 1) 2 empirical data.
Since stationarity is assumed, the covariance of the spatially stochastic process can be
reduced to
C ( si , s j ) = C ( si − s j ) = C ( h) .

9

Therefore, C ( si , s j ) depends only on the distance difference between si and s j and not on the
absolute locations. C (h) is referred to as the covariance function or the variogram and ρ (h) as
the corresponding correlation function or correlogram.
On both theoretical and practical application it is acceptable to weaken the hypothesis of
strict stationarity. Matheron (1963, 1965) developed intrinsic stationarity, which assumes that
the increments of the spatially stochastic process are weakly stationary. Intrinsic stationarity
implies that the mean and variance exist and are independent of the location. Thus
Ε [Y ( s + h) − Y ( s ) ] = 0

and
VAR [Y ( s + h) − Y ( s ) ] = 2γ ( h) .

The function 2γ (h) is termed a semi-variogram. The variogram is one-half of the semivariogram. For stationary and intrinsic attributes, the mean of Y ( s + h) − Y ( s) = 0 thus let γ (h)
be the mean square difference as defined by

1
2

γ (h) = Ε [Y ( s + h) − Y ( s) ]

2

and the method of moment estimator of an experimental variogram is

γˆ (h) =

1 N (h)
2
[Y (s + h) − Y (s)] ,
∑
2 N (h) i =1

where the summation is over all pairs of observed data points with a vector of separation h and
N(h) is the number of difference pairs. Note that when the distance difference vector is null,
theoretically the sample estimator is equal to 0. Additionally, the variogram is symmetric in h.
Figure 1 presents the general form of the variogram.
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σ2

Sill

γ ( h)

Range

h
Figure 1: General Shape of a Bounded Variogram.

Although theoretically γˆ (0) = 0 , small-scale variability may cause sample values with small
separations to be disparate. This causes a discontinuity at the origin of the experimental
variogram, which is termed the nugget. A real estate example of the nugget is the covariance of
two residential properties adjacent to each other. After controlling for the size of home, the year
built and other explanatory variables, the homes could still exhibit a high spatial correlation
because of their close proximity.
In the earth sciences, the actual distances of h may be quite uniform. For example, the
correlogram of an underground mineral deposit may be computed using readings from holes
drilled beginning at the most southern and western point of the sample plot and continued every
five yards in both a northerly and easterly direction. This will result in a uniform plot of sample
readings along with a separation vector h that will have variogram or correlogram values for h=5,
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h=10, etc. In applying the correlogram to national real estate returns, which consists of
irregularly spaced sample points, there will rarely be observations with an exact vector
separation of h. Therefore, intervals, known as lags, are created such that

γˆ (h) =

1 N (h)
2
[Y ( s + h) − Y ( s)] .
∑
2 N (h) hij ≈ h

The average of the values that fit within the lag is used as the variogram or correlogram value at
distance h. To account for observations that are on the edge of lags, a lag tolerance is often
employed. The use of a lag tolerance results in values that lie outside the lag distance being
included in the variogram and correlogram calculations. This produces a smoothing effect and
eliminates some of the arbitrary judgment of how large to establish the lag. The number of lags
is adjusted to ensure at least 30 to 50 observations in each lag. The maximum tolerance is 50
percent of the lag distance.
To compare dissimilarly-scaled variograms, the experimental variogram is standardized such
that

γˆs (h) =

γˆ (h)
(σ − h )(σ + h )

where γˆ (h) is the variogram from the separation vector h, and

σ

2
−h

1 N (h) 2
1 N (h)
2
=
∑ Y (si ) − m− h , where m− h = N (h) h∑≈h Y (si )
N (h) hij ≈ h
ij

and

σ +2h =

1 N (h) 2
1 N (h)
2
(
)
Y
s
−
m
m
=
,
where
∑ i +h
∑ Y (si ) .
+h
N (h) hij ≈ h
N (h) hij ≈ h

Division by the standard deviation of the si and sj values within each lag rescales the
variogram by the lag variance. Again, the standardized variogram is symmetric in h. For an
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omnidirectional variogram (i.e., variogram without regard for direction between observations),
the standardized variogram and correlogram are linked as ρˆ (h) = 1 − γˆs (h) .

2.3.1 The Experimental Cross-Correlogram
An extension of the empirical correlogram is the empirical cross-correlogram. Spatial
econometric methods provide the possibility of mutual estimation of multiple interconnected
data. The cross-correlogram is used in this study to establish mutual correlation between the
interconnected data of residential and commercial real estate returns.
Similar to the aforementioned correlogram, if {Y ( s ), s ∈
variable and { X ( s ), s ∈

} is the process relating to the first

} is the process relating to the second variable, and both of these

processes are assumed to be at least intrinsically stationary, then the cross-variogram is defined
as
CYX (h) = Ε [ (Y ( s + h) − µY )( X ( s + h) − µ X ) ] ,
where h is an arbitrary vector separation in

. I can extend the same mathematical derivation

mentioned previously to a cross-variogram, which is defined as
2γ YX (h) = Ε [ (Y ( s + h) − Y ( s ))( X ( s + h) − X ( s )) ] .

The sample estimator of the cross-variogram, given n pairs of observations ( yi , xi )
at sample sites si and sj is

γˆ (h) =

N (h)
1
∑ ( yi − y j )( xi − x j ) ,
2 N (h) si − s j = h

where the summation is over all pairs of observed data with a separation vector of h and N(h)
number of pairs. Again, as in the estimation of the correlogram, real estate returns will not yield
an exact separation vector h. Therefore, lag intervals are employed with the possibility of also
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using lag tolerances. Once the cross-variogram is standardized, the cross-correlogram is simply

ρˆ (h) = 1 − γˆs (h) .

2.3.2 The Theoretical Correlogram and Cross-Correlogram
Since the sample estimates of the correlogram are binned by lag intervals, the average lag value
is attributed to the mean lag distance. If a dataset has many observations, the lag distance may be
small thus creating a smooth curve. Commercial real estate return data, however, do not produce
a smooth correlogram such that a correlation value can be determined at all distances. Since the
model desired should enable a real estate investor to compute the correlation value for any
possible separation vector, the experimental correlogram is fit with the appropriate theoretical
correlogram.
The three typical theoretical correlograms are the spherical, exponential and Gaussian. The
three models are similar in shape with differences as to how quickly the model reaches a plateau
or sill. The distance at which the theoretical correlogram reaches the sill is termed the range. The
spherical theoretical model has a finite range, while the exponential and Gaussian theoretical
models asymptotically approach a limiting value. The spherical model is probably the most
commonly used bounded theoretical correlogram. Its equation is
3

h
⎛h⎞
γ (h) = 1.5 − 0.5 ⎜ ⎟ , if h ≤ a
a
⎝a⎠
where a is the range. If h is greater than the range, γ (h) = 1 . It has a linear behavior at small
separation distance and reaches the sill at a. The tangent at the origin reaches the sill at about 2 3
of the range.
Another commonly bounded theoretical model is the Gaussian. Its equation is
⎛ −3h 2 ⎞
,
2 ⎟
⎝ a ⎠

γ (h) = 1 − exp ⎜
14

where again a is the range. Unlike the spherical model, the Gaussian reaches its sill
asymptotically thus the parameter a is defined as the practical range at which the correlogram is
95 percent of the sill. The distinguishing feature of the Gaussian model is its parabolic behavior
near the origin.
After computing the empirical correlogram and cross-correlogram models, it is necessary,
then, to decide on a theoretical model. While there are methods of fitting correlogram models,
such as least squares and maximum likelihood as described by Cressie (1993), these techniques
are not usually applicable for data resulting in a small number of correlogram points. Instead, a
visual fit of the correlogram points to a few standard models is often satisfactory. Even when
there are sufficient correlogram points, a visual check against a fitted theoretical model is
appropriate as suggested by Hohn (1988).
Analysis shows that residential real estate results can be adequately modeled though a visual
check. As a doubled check of the findings of this study I employed an Indicative Goodness of Fit
(IGF) from Pannatier (1996) on the commercial property data to ensure the best theoretical
variogram. The IGF is a number without units, which is standardized to compare across diverse
experimental correlogram. An IGF value close to zero indicates a good fit. The IGF calculation
⎛
1
⎜
IGF =
⎜N
⎝

is

N

∑
k =1

2
⎞⎛
D (k ) ⎞ ⎛ γ (i ) − γˆ (i ) ⎞
⎟
∑
⎟ ,
n(k )
⎟ ⎜⎝ d (i ) ⎟⎠ ⎜⎝
σ2
⎠
P
j
(
)
i =0 ∑
j =0
⎠

n(k )

P (i )

where
N
n(k)
D(k)
P(i)
d(i)
γ (i )
γˆ (i )

σ2

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

the number of directional variograms,
the number of lags relative to variogram k,
the maximum distance relative to variogram k,
the number of pairs for lag i of variogram k,
the mean pair distance for lag i of variogram k,
the experimental measure of spatial continuity for lag i,
the modeled measure of spatial continuity for d(i), and

= the variance of the data for the variogram.
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2.4 Commercial Property Results
In this section, I examine commercial real estate attributes using the empirical and theoretical
correlogram. I use two commercial property attributes -- returns and capitalization (cap) rates.
My first data source is the National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF)
database, which collects quarterly prices for apartment, industrial, office, and retail properties.
NCREIF data allow for testing within a submarket at the zip code level. I also create the
correlogram for a database of apartment complexes given by Real Capital Analytics, Inc.
Each observation is the sale of a multifamily unit. Neither dataset includes observations from
Alaska and Hawaii due to the spatial discontinuity with the rest of the sample.

2.4.1 Spatial Correlation of NCREIF Base Returns
My initial focus is on measuring spatial correlation in a real estate sample, hence, I initially
control for time series impacts using NCREIF returns from the second quarter of 2002 to the first
quarter of 2003. While the NCREIF dataset contains observations from 1978, there are few
consecutive quarterly returns that extend over a long time period. Thus, the sample that
generates the most sample observations with the ability to examine spatial correlation totals 144
observations.
The 144 observations produce 10,296 unique pairs. I compute correlations for each of these
pairs and contrast them against the distances of separation. Since the separation distances of real
estate data are not uniform, I group sample pairs in bins. I find that the result using the NCREIF
data exhibit a degree of variability with respect to size of the bin. To eliminate some of the
arbitrary judgment of how large to establish the lag, and ensure each bin contains enough
correlation pairs, the NCREIF findings use a 50 percent lag tolerance. Table 1 and Figure 2
present the empirical spatial correlations.
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Figure 2: Spatial correlogram of U.S. commercial property returns.
Table 1: Spatial correlations in NCREIF base returns
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
5.8 miles
14.5 miles
29.0 miles
40.6 miles
58.0 miles
Log-likelihood

Number
of Obs.
310
114
368
310
168
94

Experimental
Correlogram
0.93
0.37
0.32
0.22
0.21
-0.01

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.33
0.21
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
306.18

A significant feature of the NCREIF data is that multiple property exist within the same or
adjacent zip code. In these instances, the separation distance, theoretically, equals zero. For the
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NCREIF sample, 310 pairs are adjacent to each other. The associated spatial correlation for
these 310 pairs is a near-perfect factor of 0.93.
The second separation distance demonstrates a spatial correlation of 0.37 at a distance of 5.8
miles. Subsequent correlations reduce monotonically to approximately 0.20 for a separation
distance of 40.6 miles. After this distance the experimental correlogram value decreases to
random spatial correlation. The last row in Table 1 indicates the separate distance where the
spatial correlation between all commercial properties decays to zero is approximately 60 miles.
After 60 miles, the empirical correlogram values become divergent.

2.4.2 NCREIF Returns Model
I recognize that there exist economic variables that explain correlations in commercial real estate
returns that are not attributable to space. Thus, I next control for potential determinants of
commercial property returns using an OLS specification, and subsequently model the residuals
across separation distance. The OLS model controls for property type as well as proxies for
property size and quality. Previous literature finds that economically based diversification may
be preferable to purely geographic diversification. Wurtzebach (1988) removes geography
boundaries and classifies cities based upon their dominant industry employment type and
employment growth patterns. Subsequently, Mueller and Ziering (1992) test Wutzebach's
diversification strategy and find that economic diversification offers an improvement over
geographic regions such as state boundaries. Mueller (1993) also finds that a diversification
strategy based upon nine SIC code categories provides superior diversification capabilities for a
large real estate portfolio. Thus, I incorporate the economic variables detailed by Mueller (1993)
and Cheng and Black (1998) in the following model.

Ri ,t = β 0 + β1 iln( AVESQFT ) + β 2 iln( NUMUNITS ) + β 3 iln( MVLAST )
+ β 4 i( APT ) + β5 i( IND) + β 6 i(OFFICE ) + β 7 i( RETAIL) + β8 i( POP)
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+ β 9 i( EMPLOY ) + β10 i( RATIO ) + β11 i( MIG ) + ε i ,t
where
Ri,t
AVESQFT
NUMUNITS
MVLAST
APT
IND
OFFICE
RETAIL
POP
EMPLOY
RATIO
MIG

= the rate of return on the ith property for the tth quarter,
= average square feet,
= average number of units, which is used by some apartment
complexes instead of the avesqft measure
= average market value from t-1 quarter,
= dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the property is an apartment
complex, and 0 otherwise,
= dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the property is an industrial building,
and 0 otherwise,
= dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the property is an office building,
and 0 otherwise,
= dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the property is a retail building,
and 0 otherwise,
= population by age group,
= employment by industry,
= ratio of average house price over median household income, and
= migration of persons into a zip code.

2.4.3 Spatial Correlation of NCREIF Residual Returns
Table 2 details the coefficients of the OLS parameters. The dependent variable is returns on
commercial property. The data are concentrated within U.S. zip codes. T-statistics are in
parentheses.
Table 2: Regression models to explain commercial property returns.
Model
Variable

A

B

C

Average Mkt. Value
Last Quarter

1.84
(2.37)

1.88
(2.45)

Average Square Feet

0.15
(0.41)

Average Number of
Units

1.22
(1.66)

1.13
(1.62)

1.52
(2.07)

Apartment

-35.00
(-2.44)

-33.90
(-2.42)

-3.97
(-0.68)

0.27
(0.73)
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D

E

2.07
(2.68)

2.06
(2.69)

F

-0.03
(-0.09)

-31.88
(-2.23)

-32.07
5.58
(-2.28)
(3.25)
table continued

Industrial

-29.34
(-2.06)

-28.30
(-2.02)

2.57
(0.55)

-31.23
(-2.18)

-31.49
(-2.26)

5.94
(6.57)

Office

-36.86
(-2.45)

-35.87
(-2.43)

-3.03
(-0.65)

-38.98
(-2.59)

-39.24
(-2.67)

0.32
(0.34)

Retail

-27.03
(-1.64)

-26.01
(-1.60)

6.52
(0.76)

-29.09
(-1.76)

-29.35
(-1.81)

9.93
(1.36)

0.15

0.16

0.13

0.14

0.15

0.11

Adjusted R2

Using the hedonic specification that has the greatest explanatory power as measured by
adjusted R2, I recalculate the correlogram with residual returns. The findings in Table 3 exhibit a
reduction of correlations with the exception of the juxtaposed properties. Whereas the base
returns exhibit an expected near-perfect spatial correlation, the residual returns exhibit a factor of
almost equal value - 0.90. It would be improbable to economically diversify properties in
adjacent zip codes, however, the data demonstrate that diversification by property type does not
significantly reduce spatial correlation of commercial property in the same or adjacent zip codes.
Table 3: Spatial correlations in NCREIF residual returns
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
6.0 miles
18.0 miles
32.0 miles
48.0 miles
Log-likelihood

Number
of Obs.
300
132
434
310
90

Experimental
Correlogram
0.90
0.20
0.21
0.16
0.04

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.29
0.16
0.00
0.00
0.00
318.76

The greatest reduction in spatial correlation is found for properties that are approximately 6.0
miles apart. The correlation decreases from a correlation of 0.37 to 0.20 for the residual returns.
The correlation of the residual returns at this distance is comparable to the finding for base
returns between 29.0 and 40.6 miles. Hence, it appears that diversification by property
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characteristics yields the greatest benefit for commercial properties in different neighborhoods,
assuming a neighborhood does not extend greater than 6.0 miles.
Overall, the residual return findings demonstrate that economic and property-attribute
diversification is somewhat effective in reducing spatial correlation and that the rate of decay is
higher for heterogeneous property. Additionally, the distance to obtain random spatial correlation
reduces from approximately 60 miles to about 50 miles.

2.4.4 Apartment Sales and Cap Rates
The correlograms to this point are based upon the NCREIF dataset. While the NCREIF data
allow for examination of diversification across multiple property types, a criticism of NCREIF is
that the values are based on appraisals. The use of appraisals is a potential problem because
empirical evidence suggests that appraisals smooth changes in property values, which causes
downward-biased estimates of total return volatility (Geltner (1991)). To protect against the
specific panel of data driving the results, I compute the correlograms based on sales of apartment
complexes from January 2001 to December 2003. Since the dataset includes returns and cap
rates, I compute correlation models using both attributes.1
The experimental correlogram computations in Table 4, Panel A are base returns and
comparable to the base NCREIF returns in Table 1. Whereas the base NCREIF returns decay to
zero at approximately 60 miles, the first lag distance with adequate observations using the
apartment sales is 96 miles. The spatial correlation at this separation distance is 0.28. At the
further separation distance of 129 miles the spatial correlation is 0.11. Ultimately, the base
apartment sales correlations decay to zero at approximately 144 miles.

1

I also compute betas using an equally-weighted portfolio from this dataset. In general, the betas decay to zero at
approximately 66 miles and a distance of 24 miles demonstrates spatial correlation of 0.23, but the number of
observations is quite low.
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Following the same method as the NCREIF returns, I compute spatial correlation values for
residual returns after controlling for apartment property characteristics. The residuals in Panel B
of Table 4 produce the same persistence in correlation as the base returns. The apartments
exhibit spatial correlation of 0.11 at a distance of 96 miles after controlling for size and quality.
This value compares to the NCREIF residuals which exhibit a correlation factor of the same
magnitude (i.e., 0.15) at 41 miles and zero correlation by approximately 50 miles.
Table 4: Spatial correlations in apartment sales
Separation
Distance
Panel A: Base Returns
0.0 miles
96.0 miles
129.0 miles
144.0 miles
Panel B: Residual Returns
0.0 miles
96.0 miles
129.0 miles

Number
of Obs.

Experimental
Correlogram

140
22
36
44

1.00
0.28
0.11
0.06

138
22
36

1.00
0.11
0.01

The results demonstrate stronger persistence in correlation across space than the NCREIF
data. This may be due, in part, to the more geographically continuous nature of multifamily
housing, a heavy concentration of properties in Florida, Texas, and California, and/or the lack of
diversification by property type. Another explanation could be a low number of data pairs at
shorter separation distances. The spatial literature recommends at least 30 pairs per lag distance,
which is not the case at the second lag distance using apartment sales.
To assuage small sample concerns, I also compute spatial correlograms using 1,520
apartment cap rates, which results in 2 million correlations. The spatial correlations of base cap
rates detailed in Table 5 follow a pattern comparable to the base NCREIF commercial returns.

22

The initial spatial correlation of juxtaposed apartment complexes demonstrates an almost perfect
relation. Further, the distance of random correlation is again approximately 60 miles.
Table 5: Spatial correlation in base apartment capitalization rates
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
1.5 miles
3.0 miles
6.0 miles
12.0 miles
24.0 miles
30.0 miles
36.0 miles

Number
of Obs.
3,104
1,196
4,362
6,272
6,268
5,270
5,126
4,776

Experimental
Correlogram
0.99
0.42
0.33
0.26
0.21
0.24
0.20
0.15

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.44
0.39
0.35
0.31
0.25
0.16
0.13
0.10

45.0 miles

4,120

0.14

0.07

51.0 miles

3,372

0.09

0.06

60.0 miles

6,268

0.04

0.03

Similar to the NCREIF and apartment returns, I execute an OLS regression on the apartment
cap rates, controlling for number of units, age, and a proxy for size and quality. The residual
correlations in Table 5 are similar in magnitude to the NCREIF residual returns. Again, the
results demonstrate a correlation of 0.21 at 6.0 miles, which reinforces the strategy of purchasing
real estate properties in different submarkets. The point of random correlation is found at
approximately 72 miles.
Table 6: Spatial correlation in residual apartment capitalization rates
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
6.0 miles
18.0 miles
36.0 miles
54.0 miles

Number
of Obs.
2,906
78
332
378
464

Experimental
Correlogram
0.99
0.21
0.13
0.17
0.11

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.40
0.29
0.21
0.15
0.11

72.0 miles

532

0.02

0.08
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2.4.5 MSA Pairs
Thus far, the empirical commercial results from multiple datasets using two property attributes
produce i) near-perfect initial spatial correlations, even after diversifying by property
characteristics and economic determinants, ii) a reasonably monotonic reduction in correlations
as separation distance increases, and iii) comparable distances of random spatial correlation. Our
next test examines the return correlation of MSA pairs that are adjacent to one another. I
examine these specific MSA pairs to ensure spatial discontinuity is not driving the empirical
results. For example, there are no return data for commercial properties in the expansive rural
areas of western U.S. Since commercial properties cluster in metropolitan areas, I examine 52
MSA pairs in which the metropolitan area is continuous and no rural land exists between the
paired observations.
I use NCREIF data to compute sub-MSA quarterly returns, augmented with economic data.
The economic data consists of annual employment growth rates for the entire sub-MSA and
within five major industry classifications, and population growth rates of five age groups. In
addition to providing sub-MSA observations, the NCREIF data offer the benefit of a longer time
series. Of the MSA pairs that exhibit statistical significance, the shortest time series is 16
quarters and the longest is 92 quarters. Since I want to focus specifically on the spatial aspects
of commercial real estate portfolios, I control for time-series aspects using the NCREIF national
property index, and model the residuals after controlling for the national index and economic
data.
For the entire sample of 52 MSA pairs, the separation distance measures from 3.67 miles to
111.25 miles. The empirical results from previous tests suggest that the separation distance for
random spatial correlation is approximately 50 to 60 miles. Of the sample of 52, twelve pairs
exceed 60 miles in separation distance. Five of the twelve pairs possess statistically significant
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correlations before controlling across the time series. After I control for the national property
index, economic variables, and property characteristics, I find that none of the twelve with
separation distances over 60 miles are significant. This result is consistent with previous
findings.
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Figure 3: Spatial correlation in CMSA pairs.
After controlling for the national property index and other variables, many of the 52 subMSA pairs are not statistically significant. Figure 3 displays the MSA pairs that demonstrate
residual return correlations that are significant. Of the fifteen significant pairs, twelve exhibit
positive correlation. The correlation findings of the shortest two separation distances (9.02 and
12.99 miles) are consistent with previous results. The correlations of approximately 0.25 are
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similar to the NCREIF residual returns and apartment residual cap rates at the same distances.
Somewhat surprising is the cluster of positive correlations between separation distances of 24 to
43 miles. The average distance is 33.23 miles with an average correlation within this cluster of
0.39. This result suggests that spatial correlation exists within MSAs.

2.5 Residential Property
In addition to multiple databases and two different real estate attributes, I also want to examine
the impact of residential property on the spatial aspect of commercial property. While most
commercial real estate investment portfolios will not incorporate residential property, local
housing markets can offer insight into the economic behavior of commercial property. I examine
base and residual residential returns and then combine commercial and residential data types in
the next section.
I compute residential returns from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), a dataset
that geographically standardizes the U.S. decennial census based upon year 2000 census tracts. I
compute 9000 base residential returns initially aggregated to the zip code level. The resulting
correlogram models use over forty million pairs. I also compute returns over the various decade
combinations of 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, and 1970 to 1990. Table 7 shows the values of the
base returns.
Table 7: Spatial correlations of residential base returns.
Separation
Distance
Panel A: 1970-1980
30.61 miles
153.05 miles
306.10 miles
459.15 miles

Number
of Obs.

Experimental
Correlogram

Theoretical
Correlogram

345,901
513,825
709,321
832,363

0.38
0.28
0.20
0.24

0.42
0.36
0.28
0.21
table continued
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612.20 miles
765.25 miles
948.91 miles
Panel B: 1980-1990
15.31 miles
61.22 miles
122.44 miles
183.66 miles
244.88 miles
275.49 miles
306.10 miles
Panel C: 1970-1990
30.61 miles
153.05 miles
306.10 miles
459.15 miles
612.20 miles
765.25 miles
918.30 miles
1,010.13 miles

816,794
670,650
671,954

0.19
0.10
0.00

0.14
0.08
0.01

130,541
219,652
239,948
274,317
332,306
338,173
360,056

0.57
0.54
0.42
0.37
0.20
0.13
0.01

0.62
0.51
0.38
0.25
0.14
0.09
0.04

345,901
513,825
709,321
832,363
816,794
670,650
652,836
722,171

0.35
0.35
0.19
0.14
0.12
0.09
0.06
0.01

0.40
0.33
0.26
0.19
0.12
0.07
0.02
0.00

The results indicate a significantly lower initial spatial correlation than commercial property.
This is due, in part, to a lack of return values where the separation distance is theoretically zero.
Therefore, the initial spatial correlation measures 30.61 miles in a separation distance. The
resulting spatial correlation is 0.35. Subsequent correlation decays monotonically to a zero
separation distance at 1,101.13 miles, a considerably longer distance than the commercial
property results.
Similar to commercial returns, it is reasonable to expect that there exist determinants that
explain a portion of the correlation. Thus, I regress the base residential returns by some typical
determinants of housing prices, such as education, family income, a proxy for house size, the
number of persons of age to buy a home, and the age of the home. Table 8 presents the
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coefficients and t-statistics of the regression model of 1970-1980 residential returns. As
expected, all determinants are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The specification is

Ri ,t = β 0 + β1 iln( EDUC12) + β 2 iln( EDUC16) + β 3 iln( EDUCPP) + β 4 iln( INCOME )
+ β 5 iln( SIZE ) + β 6 iln( BLTOC 70) + β 7 iln( BLTOC 59) + β8 iln( BLTOC 49)

+ β 9 iln( BLTOC 39) + ε i ,t
where
Ri
EDUC12
EDUC12
EDUCPP
INCOME
SIZE
BLTOC

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

the rate of return on the ith house,
persons 25 years old or older who completed high school,
persons 25 years old or older who completed college,
number of persons 25 years and older,
average family income,
aggregate number of rooms in a home, and
total occupied housing units built up to the year specified in the variable.

Using the OLS residuals, I compute the return correlations for each observation within
census tracts. The residuals are not aggregated across zip codes but left within census tracts
since each observation is the remaining portion not explained by the model, and thus is unique
information. This method produces slightly less than one billion observations for each time
period. Table 9 provides the details for the longer period from 1970 to 1990.
Table 8: Hedonic regression model of 1970-1980 residential returns.
Log. Return
using 1970
RHS variables

Log. Return
using 1980
RHS variables

Intercept

5.925
(46.97)

-1.373
(-10.44)

High School Education (educ12)

0.094
(9.90)

0.126
(13.70)

College Education (educ16)

0.045
(10.76)

0.038
(7.70)

Num. of Persons 25 yrs. & older

-0.579
(-26.84)

-0.020
(-0.92)
table continued
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Family Income (income)

-0.021
(-1.73)

0.365
(31.22)

Aggregate Number of Rooms (size)

-0.169
(-8.60)

-0.099
(-5.27)

Year built 1970-1980 (bltoc80)

0.167
(93.68)

Year built 1960-1969 (bltoc70)

0.080
(44.01)

-0.070
(-21.67)

Year built 1950-1959 (bltoc59)

0.023
(7.12)

-0.152
(-41.03)

Year built 1940-1949 (bltoc49)

0.009
(2.61)

0.011
(3.00)

Year built 1970-1980 (bltoc39)

0.004
(1.51)

-0.079
(-33.09)

R2

0.4996

0.4667

Table 9: Spatial correlations of residential return residuals.
Separation
Number
Distance
of Obs.
Panel A: 1970-1980 using 1970 RHS variables
15.31 miles
4,777,264
30.61 miles
6,192,038
76.53 miles
4,175,299
153.05 miles
4,883,237

Experimental
Correlogram

Theoretical
Correlogram

0.14
0.13
0.13
0.09

0.15
0.15
0.13
0.09

229.58 miles
5,898,320
306.10 miles
6,478,281
Panel B: 1980-1990 using 1990 RHS variables
30.61 miles
7,156,825
61.22 miles
5,528,380
153.05 miles
6,429,092
229.58 miles
7,637,638
244.88 miles
8,104,028
260.19 miles
9,058,917
Panel C: 1970-1990 using 1990 RHS variables
15.31 miles
4,783,788

0.08
0.04

0.04
-0.01

0.13
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.11
-0.03

0.20
0.19
0.13
0.07
0.06
0.05

0.19
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0.25
table continued

30.61 miles
76.53 miles
153.05 miles
229.58 miles
382.63 miles
428.54 miles

6,198,538
4,178,956
5,898,176
6,483,273
7,302,486
7,112,267

0.17
0.22
0.22
0.07
0.09
0.03

0.25
0.23
0.19
0.08
0.03
0.01

While the magnitude of the spatial correlations is not surprising, it is interesting to note that,
based on millions of observations, residential properties extending 150 - 225 miles in separation
distance demonstrate an empirical correlation of roughly 0.20. One implication is that public
policy changes and economic conditions in one community could have substantial spillover
effects on property values in communities hundreds of miles away.

2.6 Combining Commercial and Residential Types
Given the voluminous amount of data available for residential property, I next examine the effect
of including the residential property type in the commercial analysis. Inclusion in the
correlogram is based upon the fact that commercial and residential markets are affected by
similar economic conditions at common locations. Another argument is termed co-kriging in the
spatial literature. The reasoning follows that if the secondary residential returns are correlated
with the primary commercial returns, then one can utilize observations at sites where they are
both recorded to estimate this correlation. Hence, I use the residential returns as an independent
variable in the previous NCREIF commercial return specification. I also use another spatial
econometric model to determine if the two general types of property returns have a common
spatial correlation.

2.6.1 Commercial Correlogram with Residential Returns
To discover how residential returns can offer additional insight into commercial spatial
correlation, I match residential returns by location and include them as an explanatory variable in
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the NCREIF commercial return specification along with the other property characteristics. I lag
the residential returns one quarter to avoid potential simultaneity between commercial and
residential prices in the same quarter. The other change of the NCREIF specification is that the
economic variables are removed since residential real estate is a proxy for economic conditions
at common locations.
The spatial correlation results in Table 10 are consistent with previous findings. The
empirical results indicate a separation distance to obtain random spatial correlation between 40.6
and 58 miles. Also consistent with previous results is the high initial correlation of adjacent
properties. The correlation value of 0.89 is effectively the same as the factor using NCREIF
residuals.
Table 10: Spatial correlations in commercial residuals after controlling for residential returns.
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
5.8 miles
14.5 miles
29.0 miles
40.6 miles

Number
of Obs.
308
114
364
308
168

Experimental
Correlogram
0.89
0.30
0.12
0.07
0.12

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.30
0.28
0.19
0.02
-0.03

58.0 miles

92

-0.11

-0.05

2.6.2 Cross-Correlogram
Spatial econometrics offers a specification termed the cross-correlogram, whereby two data types
can be combined into the same model. The cross-correlogram combines the correlation of two
commercial properties with the correlation of two residential properties. I compute cross-spatial
correlations using commercial and residential returns for each unique location.
Since the NCDB data are not available for the NCREIF quarters under study, I use residential
data from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The OFHEO dataset
31

provides quarter residential housing prices, which I match to the 144 zip code observations from
the NCREIF data. Table 11 reports the findings of matching the commercial and residential
property returns. It appears that the cross-correlogram combines the findings of both the
residential and commercial data. First, the initial correlation is not as pronounced as the
commercial correlograms but slightly more than the residential models. Second, the distance of
random spatial correlation increases, which could be the residential influence of residual
correlation at hundreds of miles. Last, the rate of decay appears to be a compromise between
commercial and residential property types. The cross-correlogram values compute between 0.50
and 0.37 from zero separation distance to 87 miles. After 87.0 miles the correlation decays
immediately to zero at 101.5 miles.
Table 11: Cross-correlogram values of commercial and residential returns.
Separation
Distance
0.0 miles
14.5 miles
29.0 miles
43.5 miles
58.0 miles

Number
of Obs.
136
368
312
166
94

Experimental
Correlogram
0.50
0.50
0.41
0.38
0.37

Theoretical
Correlogram
0.50
0.48
0.42
0.33
0.24

72.5 miles
87.0 miles
101.5 miles

44
20
50

0.42
0.41
-0.02

0.15
0.08
0.03

2.7 Applying Empirical Results to Portfolio Theory
From the various empirical insights of the spatial correlation of commercial real estate, our last
analysis is to apply the empirical findings to the theoretical understanding from section 2.
Equation (1) shows that, asymptotically, the risk of a real estate portfolio is the average
correlation. I apply this result to three simulations to determine real estate portfolio risk.
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At one end of the spectrum is the situation when a real estate portfolio manager desires to
directly own properties within adjacent zip codes or a sub-market. Given that the spatial
correlation of such a portfolio is approximately 0.90, a question arises as to how many properties
should this investor own to reduce the unsystematic risk. This is akin to building a diversified
stock portfolio where the benefits of diversification are achieved with approximately fifteen lessthen-perfectly correlated stocks.2 The theory in section 2 shows that, asymptotically, the average
correlation will be realized for a portfolio. For a finite number of real estate assets the spatial
correlation will not only be the correlations between the assets but the variance of each real
estate property (the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix). The correlation of an asset with
itself is one, thus, the risk of a portfolio concentrated in a sub-market or adjacent zip codes is at
least 0.90, without regard for the number of properties.
σ(R )
p
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Figure 5: Real estate portfolio risk as a function of spatial correlation.

2

Fama (1976) finds the portfolio standard deviation of an equally weighted portfolio of two securities is 7.2 percent,
which reduces monotonically to 3.8 percent with a portfolio of fifteen randomly selected stocks
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On the other end of the spectrum is the scenario when a commercial property portfolio holds
property at least 60 miles in separation distance, including owning property of the same type.
Using Consolidated MSAs centroids as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, I note that there are
no CMSAs within the largest 50, as measured by population, that are within 60 miles of any of
the other largest 50 CMSAs. Further, 4,946 out of the 4,950 pairs of the largest 100 CMSAs are
at least 48 miles apart and 11,164 out of the 11,175 pairs of the largest 150 CMSAs are separated
by at least 48 miles. Overall, there exist 36,267 pairs of the 270 contiguous U.S. CMSAs that
result in a separation distance equal or greater than 60 miles. Hence, a strategy to remove spatial
risk from a real estate portfolio is to hold one property per MSA. Holding one property in each
of the 50 largest MSAs will reduce the portfolio standard deviation to 1

50 or 14 percent.

Given the search and on-going portfolio costs associated with owning one property per
MSAs, I next consider owning properties within the same MSA submarket but in diverse
neighborhoods. Note that the largest rate of decay in spatial correlation occurs beyond
juxtaposed properties. Therefore, I conduct simulations of portfolios using a square grid of
properties where the adjacent properties are six or twelve miles apart. The resulting portfolio
standard deviations are presented in Figure 5. Assuming a six mile separation distance between
adjacent properties, the leftmost star in Figure 5 indicates a portfolio standard deviation of 54.2
percent for a 3x3 square grid of nine properties. Adding more properties to the portfolio helps
reduce the spatial correlation. The portfolio standard deviation is 52.9 percent for a 4x4 grid of
16 properties, 50.3 percent for a 6x6 configuration, and 46.6 percent for 64 properties. While the
spatial correlation decays monotonically, a total of 100 properties produce significant
unsystematic portfolio risk of 41.4 percent.
The results of the simulation assuming twelve mile separation distance between neighboring
properties are better with regards to reducing spatial correlation but may not be entirely practical.
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The findings in Figure 5 show that the portfolio standard deviation begins at 47.4 percent for
nine properties in a 3x3 square grid. Again, the spatial correlation decays as more properties are
added to the portfolio such that a 10x10 grid of 100 properties results in a portfolio standard
deviation of 24.5 percent. While the spatial correlation is reduced, the practical question
becomes one asking how many properties can be owned within an MSA submarket. The
geometry of the portfolio is important since properties owned in a straight line will yield a lower
spatial correlation. However, most MSA submarkets will be limited to five or six properties in a
straight line at twelve miles apart. Additional properties will increase overall spatial correlation
because any new property cannot be extended along the straight line but, instead, added next to
an existing property. This fact, termed infill in the spatial literature, generates an increasingly
denser spatial portfolio. And even if a real estate portfolio manager owned, for example, seven
properties in a straight line from one end to the other, the portfolio standard deviation equals
roughly 40 percent.
Since the proceeding three simulations are based upon the same property type, I also examine
the impact of diversification by property type. Because the two extreme scenarios of no spatial
diversification and total spatial diversification do not change, I examine the effects of propertytype diversification within an MSA submarket. The results demonstrate that diversification by
property type does not mitigate portfolio risk. For example, a portfolio of 16 properties
diversified using the four main property types and each separated by at least 18 miles, produces
portfolio standard deviation of 27 percent. I look at the other combinations of 25 properties in a
5x5 grid with adjacent properties separated by at least 12 miles, 36 properties in a 6x6 grid
separated by at least 15 miles, and 60 properties in a 6x10 grid separated by at least 15 miles.
The portfolio standard deviations are 32 percent, 24 percent, and 19 percent, respectively.
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These simulations demonstrate that spatial correlation in real estate portfolios is significantly
different than the traditional finance models where unsystematic risk is quickly reduced as more
stocks are added to a portfolio. In fact, adding more properties to a real estate portfolio may
increase unsystematic risk due to infill.

2.8 Chapter Summary
Real estate is a field built on the notion of location, yet the commercial real estate portfolio the
literature does not formal spatial techniques to examine the effects of geography on commercial
property portfolios. Consistent with the axiomatic importance of location on commercial
property prices, this chapter employs spatial econometrics to quantify the spatial correlation of
commercial property. Adoption of the methods will assist portfolio managers in creating
efficient commercial real estate portfolio.
The next chapter addresses another large-scale real estate portfolio. REITs are a popular
investment vehicle, particularly for those investors who self select to received dividend income.
The next section investigates the dividend policy of REITs.
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3. REIT Dividend Payouts
REITs are currently required by tax law to pay out 90 percent of its taxable earnings to maintain
the REIT organizational form. Initially, this constraint appears binding, leaving a REIT manager
with limited latitude to dictate payout policy. However, as detailed in Wang, Erickson, and Gau
(1993) and Kallberg, Liu, and Srinivasan (2003), some REITs possess payout flexibility.
Particularly for equity REITs, which directly own real estate assets, the 90 percent payout of
taxable earnings can be significantly different from the gross cash flows.
The ability of REIT managers to vary dividend payouts has led to conflicting explanations in
the real estate literature as to what REIT managers are accomplishing by managing their payout
policies. On one hand, Wang, Erickson, and Gau (1993) explore the determinants of REIT
dividend payouts, and find that, on average, REITs with lower return-on-asset ratios demonstrate
higher dividend payouts. They contend that the market has less incentive to monitor a REIT
with superior performance, therefore, REIT dividend policies are at least partially determined by
agency cost theory. Lee and Slawson (2005) also find evidence of agency-cost explanations
based upon the dividend policies of inefficiently monitored REITs. On the other hand, Bradley,
Capozza, and Seguin (1998) examine REIT dividends as a function of cash flow uncertainty, and
find that a fitted volatility measure is significantly negatively correlated with the payout of
dividends. They posit that their findings are consistent with information-based theories and not
agency-cost explanations.
I reexamine the dividend behavior of REITs to address the open issue, and find results that
are materially different from the previous studies. Using explanatory variables based upon
studies of dividend policy from the financial economic literature, I find that the dividend
payment made by equity REIT managers are not affected by traditional measures of agency costs
or asymmetric information. Instead, the results confirm the importance of contemporaneous net
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income and the level of dividends paid last period, which is direct affirmation of the Lintner
(1956) partial adjustment model that is prevalent in the finance literature. The other two factors
that have some statistical power in explaining REIT dividend payments are the natural logarithm
of assets, which I argue is a proxy for firm volatility, and the tax law change effective January
2001, when the 95 percent payout of taxable earnings was reduced to 90 percent.
One of the reasons our results differ from previous studies is the understatement of standard
errors that cloud inferences. Dividend payments are correlated cross-sectionally and across time.
Also, dividend payments exhibit endogeneity with a number of the independent variables that
explain dividend payouts. I account for these econometric issues using generalized least squares
(GLS), two-way random effects, instrumental variables (IV), and by scaling appropriate
variables by total assets. I find that proper econometric methods have a material effect on the
results.
In addition to explaining dividend payments with a full model, I restrict the specification to
the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model, and examine whether REITs smooth their
dividends. I note that REITs are not strict residual payers, however, the Lintner (1956) model
does not detect much dividend smoothing. The raw data demonstrate some systematic dividend
payments, but this is not detected by the Lintner (1956) model.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 presents background on market
imperfections and the REIT structure. Section 3.2 explains the sample and research design.
Section 3.3 presents the empirical results. Section 3.4 summarizes the chapter.

3.1 The REIT Structure
REITs possess a straightforward organizational structure to examine dividend policy. This is
especially true when compared to industrial firms. For non-REIT firms, project confidentiality,
adverse selection, and moral hazard can hinder the direct transfer of information between market
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participants. Conversely, REIT investors and analysts are aware of the real estate assets and
mortgages held by publicly traded REITs. In general, REITs are valued similarly to non-REIT
firms -- investors discount future cash flows. Given (i) the ability to witness the holdings of a
REIT, (ii) that there exists an active market for assets similar to those owned by REITs, and (iii)
the REIT's income is not based upon technologically advanced processes, investors have greater
insight into the future cash flows of a REIT. This is especially true for mortgage REITs where
there is little, if any, private information regarding the balance sheet.
One of the conditions of REIT status is that at least 75 percent of a REIT's assets must
consist of real estate assets, cash, and government securities. A further requirement is that at
least 75 percent of the REIT's gross income must be obtained from real estate assets. These
conditions aid in our examination of dividend policy by restricting firms in the study to the real
estate industry and reducing industry effects. Further, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that
regulation restricts the investment options available to managers. Smith and Watts (1992) extend
the argument by predicting that a restricted investment set assists in mitigating agency problems.
It follows that disciplining mechanisms and management's impact on firm value are reduced in
all types of REITs.
Jensen's (1986) free cash flow hypothesis has another implication for REITs. The free cash
flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) argues that agency costs are reduced and firm value is
maximized when management adheres to a policy of paying out all FCF, which is the amount in
excess of the funds required to fund positive net present value (NPV) projects. By dispensing all
FCF, the amount of resources under the control of managers is reduced, thereby reducing
managerial power and the potential of empire building. Since REITs must pay out 90 percent of
their taxable income, it follows that a manager's discretion over FCF is reduced.3 Consistent

3

The payout percentage was 95 percent until December 31, 2000.
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with the FCF hypothesis, Mooradian and Yang (2001) find that equity REITs within the hotel
industry have significantly smaller amounts of FCF than non-REIT hotel firms.
By organizational form, REITs eliminate taxes from the examination of dividend policy. In
addition, REITs control for tax clientele effects. Due to the required dividend payments and high
yields, REITs creates a subset of dividend-paying stocks that should result in a homogenous
investor clientele. Investors purchase REIT stocks knowing that they will receive a high
dividend yield, and REIT shareholders self select based upon their preference for taxable
income.
Equity REITs offer another reduction in asymmetric information when assessing firm value.
Instead of discounting long-term dividend projection like non-REIT firms, REIT analysts
estimate the aggregate net operating income of the REIT's holdings for the next year. The
aggregate net operating income is then capitalized by a weighted average capitalization rate for
the portfolio. The capitalization rates for REITs are quite specific and standardized within each
particular REIT sub-industry (e.g., apartment, industrial, and retail). As detailed by Ling and
Archer (2005), capitalization rates are determined directly from comparable sales transactions,
appraisers, and institutional investors. The capitalization process also uses information from the
private real estate market to perform a mass appraisal of the REIT's properties. The ability to use
information from the well-functioning private real estate market to value shares of a publicly
traded REIT is unique and distinguishes the REIT market from other industries where assets are
not separately traded in a private market.
Thus far I have described an organizational form that possesses mechanisms that eliminate
consideration of taxes and significantly reduce the effects of agency problems and asymmetric
information. The other market imperfection described by Allen and Michaely (1995) that REITs
control for is transaction costs. Because the REITs capital structure requires a 90 percent payout
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of taxable income, capital accumulation and FCF are reduced. It follows that agency costs and
asymmetric information are reduced since REITs must continuously be active in the capital
markets, and these markets act as an additional monitor of firm activities. And while REITs
must expend effort on obtaining new capital, at the margin, the transaction costs associate with
new capital is minimal since the firm is constantly in the market.
In general, REITs closely align with the perfect market assumptions of the MM (1961)
dividend irrelevance theory. REITs also remove Black's (1976) dividend puzzle from
consideration since REITs must pay a dividend and are not taxed if the firm meets qualification
requirements. Many theoretical and empirical studies examine the interaction of these market
imperfections with dividend policy, however, I are unaware of any studies that are able to control
for the market inefficiencies in the manner of the REIT structure.

3.2 Dividend Payout Research Design
This study examines firms from the Compustat database with SIC code 6798 from 1992 to 2003.
Prior to 1992, REITs operated on a deal-to-deal basis, and were opportunistic in looking for the
cheapest financing deals each month. Also, they were largely entrepreneurial companies with
little to no centralized support or corporate governance. The modern REIT has moved to a
corporate finance mindset, relying more on setting long-term strategies to guide their decisions.
Ott, Riddiough, and Yi (2005) find that financing policy stabilized during what they term the
new-REIT period after 1992. They conjecture the stabilization is an outcome in response to
monitoring by outside investors and rating agencies. Additionally, the year 1992 was when the
Taubman Centers REIT developed the UPREIT, or Umbrella Partnership REIT, as a mechanism
to enable property owners to defer recognition of capital gains on properties contributed to the
REIT in exchange for partnership units. The UPREIT structure is common in today's REIT
industry, hence, I control for the structure by beginning the study after its introduction.
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From the sample of firms with SIC code 6798, I confirm each firm as either an equity or a
mortgage REIT. I remove any hybrid REITs and other firms that are listed in Compustat with the
SIC code 6798 but are not REITs. Hybrid REITs, which hold a balanced mix of debt obligations
and real properties, are removed to study the dividend policy of the equity and mortgage REIT
environments without clouding the inferences using an organizational form holding both types of
assets. I also remove captive trusts since Hsieh and Sirmans (1991) find that REIT that are
captive financing vehicles for their sponsors demonstrate financial performance different than
non-captive REITs. Lastly, I remove liquidating trusts that are set up solely to dispose of the real
estate assets.
One of the main issues in any empirical work regarding dividend payouts is the assumption
of independent random error terms in a model to explain dividend payments. Dividend payers
avoid reducing dividend payouts and, thus, tend to smooth dividend payments. The very
definition of dividend smoothing implies serial correlation. Further, small (large) firms tend to
pay smaller (larger) dividends, thus, heteroscedasticity is an issue. When cross-section
regressions are employed in previous finance and real estate empirical studies, the correlation of
residuals across firms seems to be ignored. When panel data is employed, both the cross-section
and time series autocorrelation have not been corrected. Ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimators, while unbiased, are inefficient in studies of dividend payments, which understates
standard errors and clouds inferences. Hence, any inference may not correctly portray the true
state of nature of dividend policy. I find that the residuals of an unrestricted model accounting
for the economic explanations of dividend payout exhibit serial correlation with an estimated
first order coefficient of 0.25. Durbin-Watson autocorrelation tests are statistically significant
with p-values less than 0.01. I correct for the serial correlation of dividend smoothing by
employing generalized least squares (GLS), using the OLS residuals to estimate the covariances
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across observations (i.e., Yule-Walker estimates). Also, I correct for heteroscedasticity by
scaling the dividend payments by total book assets.

3.3 Dividend Payout Empirical Results
An initial examination of dividend payouts of U.S. equity and mortgage REITs reveals that
REITs pay out considerably more than non-REIT firms. Figure 6 illustrates the mean and
median payout of preferred and common stock dividends, combined, as a percentage of net
income for REITs, as well as mean payout of a 40 percent sample of non-REIT firms from the
Computstat Industrial database. The REIT measures include mortgage and equity REITs but no
hybrid structures. As shown, REITs pay out considerably more dividends than non-REIT firm.
Further, the median REIT payout in most years is higher than 90 percent payout required by
REIT tax law. In contrast, the average dividend payout for non-REIT firms is a reasonably
stable 22 percent.
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Figure 6: Dividend Payouts of REITs and Industrial Firms
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3.3.1 Residual Payout Test
Due to the high dividend payout, one expectation is that REIT managers must follow a residual
payout policy, which implies that REITs pay out all amounts left over after deducting capital
expenditures from internally generated cash flows, and have little discretion over their dividend
policy. To test this hypothesis, I use a measure of residual payout policy taken from Baker and
Smith (2006), who standardize the amount of FCF by the contemporaneous market value for
non-REIT firms. FCF is determined in the manner employed by Lehn and Poulsen (1989). The
intuition of the measure is that if a firm follows a residual dividend policy, they will exhibit a
mean, median, and standard deviation of standardized FCF near zero. The details of the measure
for both REIT and non-REIT firms, and residual policy firms (RPFs) and non-RPFs are
presented in Table 12.
Table 12: Statistical measures of REIT standardized free cash flow.
Statistical
Measures
Mean
Median
Standard
Deviation

All REITs

Equity REITs

1.88
2.90
27.44

2.28
2.94
27.45

Mortgage
REITs
-2.13
1.58
27.08

B&S NonREIT RPFs
1.46
1.51
1.93

B&S Non-REIT
Non-RPFs
23.62
4.42
56.05

For the full sample of REITs from 1992 to 2003, the average standardized FCF is 1.88
percent and the median is 2.90 percent. Surprisingly, the standard deviation of the standardized
measure is 27.44 percent. In comparison, the Baker and Smith (2006) study finds that the two
quintiles exhibiting the metrics closest to zero, and considered to be RPFs, demonstrate an
average standardized FCF of 1.46 percent, a median standardized FCF of 1.51 percent, and an
average standard deviation of 1.93 percent. The firms in the Baker and Smith (2006) paper that
are at the opposite end of the spectrum, and considered to be non-RPFs, exhibit an average
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standardized FCF of 23.62 percent, a median of 4.42 percent, and a standard deviation of 56.05
percent. Thus, the mean of standardized FCF for REITs is more in line with firms that follow a
residual dividend policy, however, the median and standard deviation REIT metrics are not
conclusive.
To determine if REIT type has an impact on whether a firm adheres to a residual dividend
policy, I split the sample between equity and mortgage REITs and compute the standardized FCF
metrics for each subsample. A rationale for this test is that equity REITs will have more FCF
after the sale of a major holding and may not immediately invest the funds into another project.
Holding onto the cash, and thus affecting the standardize FCF measure, until the opportune time
can still fulfill the maximization of shareholders' wealth, but will not cause the equity REIT to
distribute excess cash to shareholders. Alternatively, mortgage REITs may not have the ability
to maintain FCF due to the lack of tax shields, or may not desire to hold on to cash in the same
manner due to a continuous supply of investment options in the U.S. mortgage market.
The results of splitting the sample based upon REIT types are consistent with the full sample.
I find that 1,469 firm-year equity REIT observations exhibit an average standardized FCF of 2.28
percent, a median of 2.94 percent, and a standard deviation of 27.45 percent. The levels are
similar to the full sample and all measures are statistically different from zero, which is also true
of the full sample. The 148 firm-year mortgage REIT observations produce a mean of -2.13
percent, a median of 1.58 percent, and a standard deviation of 27.08 percent. The mean of the
mortgage REITs is not statistically significant, computing a {\it p}-value of 0.34. The median
and standard deviation measures are statistically significant.
In general, the REIT measures are significantly different than the RPFs in the Baker and
Smith (2006) sample of non-REIT firms. And this finding holds for both equity and mortgage

45

REITs. Hence, based upon the standardized FCF measure, REITs do not exhibit a strict residual
dividend policy.

3.3.2 Determinants of Dividend Policy
Since REITs demonstrate a less than strict residual dividend policy I next question if certain firm
characteristics are significant in determining the dividend policy of REITs. To address the issue,
I examine explanatory variables based upon the economic theory of investment opportunities,
agency issues, asymmetric information, and profitability. Using existing theories and previous
empirical studies of dividend policy within the financial economic literature, I examine the
following model of REIT dividend behavior. Table 13 details summary statistics of the model
variables.
Table 13: Summary statistics of REIT characteristics.
Variable

N

Mean

Median

Ei,t/Ai,t
Growth
Tobin’s Q
Slack
Free Cash Flow
Ln(Assets)
Leverage
Dispersion
Asset Turnover
Change in Debt
Liquid Ratio
Type

1714
1714
1573
1712
1628
1714
1713
1617
1714
1712
1591
1714

0.03
40.53
1.03
0.03
18.62
6.26
0.56
0.00
0.16
88.64
7.66
0.91

0.03
8.64
1.02
0.01
7.94
6.50
0.58
-0.03
0.14
17.71
0.78
1.00

Standard
Deviation
0.05
509.05
0.37
0.05
109.76
1.60
0.23
1.58
0.17
418.40
50.15
0.29

Minimum

Maximum

-0.44
-93.34
-0.61
0.00
-3,513.10
0.86
0.00
-4.63
0.01
-1,508.21
0.00
0.00

0.78
20,701.09
3.46
0.58
628.99
10.16
1.15
4.17
3.12
10,385.57
1,397.01
1.00

Unlike previous studies of REIT dividend payout, the dividend payout dependent variable is
not scaled by net income or shares outstanding, but instead, dividends are divided by
contemporaneous total assets of the REIT. I employ this method for a number of reasons. First,
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as mentioned previously, scaling by total firm assets mitigates heteroscedasticity, which is not
true of scaling by net income or shares outstanding. Second, scaling by total assets avoids the
influential observation problem when earnings are near zero. Last, since I know that earnings
have a significant effect on dividend payouts, and may be a proxy for investments in place, I
want to empirically determine the effect of net income by controlling for it as a dependent
variable.
The dividend payout results are presented in Table 14. The findings of the various models
demonstrate that net income is an important determinant of REIT dividend payouts. This is to be
expected as shown by many tests of the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model in the finance
literature, where models of dividend payments are usually restricted to contemporaneous net
income and lagged dividends.4 Also statistically significant and confirmed by numerous
examinations of the Lintner (1956) model is the positive relation between lagged and
contemporaneous dividend payouts. The positive relation between net income and dividend
payments is also consistent with Bradley, et al. (1998), who split net income between the level of
earnings lagged one period and the change in earnings.5 They find a positive relation for both
explanatory variables.
Table 14: Results of GLS regressions on unrestricted models of REIT dividend policy.
Explanatory Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Intercept

0.04
(4.94)

0.05
(5.07)

0.05
(4.59)

Earnings

0.72
(26.75)

0.71
(26.25)

0.72
(26.54)

Lag(Dividends)

0.15
(4.66)

0.18
(5.60)

0.15
(4.82)
table continued

4
5

Tests of the Linter (1956) include Fama and Babiak (1968), Fama and French (2002), and Brav et al. (2005).
Bradley, et al. (1998) use funds from operations as their measure of net income.
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Growth (x10-6)

-3.73
(-1.95)

-4.30
(-2.20)

-3.77
(-1.95)

Tobin’s Q

0.01
(2.40)

0.01
(2.62)

0.01
(2.58)

Slack

0.08
(3.31)

0.09
(3.91)

0.08
(3.16)

Free Cash Flow (x10-4)

-0.46
(-1.67)

-0.28
(-1.09)

-0.42
(-1.51)

Ln(Assets)

-0.01
(-6.44)

-0.01
(-6.52)

-0.01
(-6.17)

Leverage

0.02
(2.18)

0.01
(2.15)

0.01
(1.94)

Dispersion

0.00
(1.22)

0.00
(0.82)

0.00
(1.04)

Asset Turnover

-0.00
(-0.16)

-0.00
(-0.22)

0.00
(0.13)

Change in Debt

0.00
(0.90)

0.00
(0.67)

0.00
(0.83)

Liquid Ratio

-0.00
(-1.76)

-0.00
(-1.75)

-0.00
(-1.73)

Post 2000

-0.00
(-1.37)

-0.00
(-1.06)

-0.00
(-0.32)

-0.01
(-1.53)

-0.01
(-1.57)

No

No

Yes

0.44

0.44

0.44

Type
Year Dummies
R

2

One concern with the specifications in Table 14 is the simultaneous determination of REIT
dividend policy with a number of the explanatory variables. For example, a REIT may borrow
funds to pay a dividend and thus affect their leverage ratio in the same period. Hence, due to the
endogeneity of dividend policy, the assumption that the independent variables and error term for
each observation may not hold for the models in Table 14. To account for this issue, I utilize the
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alternative estimation method of instrumental variables (IV). I lag each variable one period with
the exception of net income. In the numerous studies of the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment
model, it is clear that contemporaneous net income is an important determinant of dividend
payouts.
Table 15 details the results of the IV specification, again correcting for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation. As expected, net income and the magnitude of the dividend payment last period
continue as important determinants of REIT dividend policy. Another variable exhibiting some
explanatory power is slack. Since slack is defined as cash scaled by total assets, the positive
relation between slack and dividends suggests higher (lower) dividend payouts when more (less)
cash is available. Initially, the amount of cash on hand affecting the level of dividend payout
seems reasonable, but it is not entirely consistent with empirical studies of dividend reductions or
the theory of dividend smoothing. Wang et al. (1993) show that equity REITs suffer a negative
return when a dividend reduction is announced. Thus, a statistically significantly relation
between cash and dividend payout is surprising since a reduction in cash implies a reduction in
dividend.
Table 15: Results of GLS regressions using instrumental variables to explain REIT dividend
payments.
Explanatory Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Intercept

0.06
(5.60)

0.06
(5.54)

0.06
(4.95)

Earnings

0.70
(25.55)

0.70
(25.55)

0.70
(25.30)

Lag(Dividends)

0.18
(3.49)

0.18
(3.42)

0.18
(3.13)

Lag(Growth )(x10-7)

2.97
(0.20)

2.91
(0.19)

3.20
(0.21)

0.00

0.00

0.00

Lag(Tobin’s Q)

table continued
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(0.67)

(0.96)

(0.73)

Lag(Slack)

0.04
(1.84)

0.04
(1.76)

0.04
(1.57)

Lag(Free Cash Flow)

0.00
(0.41)

0.00
(0.48)

0.00
(0.50)

Lag(Ln(Assets))

-0.01
(-4.98)

-0.01
(-4.95)

-0.01
(-4.57)

Lag(Leverage)

-0.00
(-0.31)

-0.00
(-0.49)

-0.00
(-0.42)

Lag(Dispersion)

0.00
(0.32)

0.00
(0.22)

0.00
(0.23)

Lag(Asset Turnover)

-0.01
(-0.83)

-0.01
(-0.70)

-0.01
(-0.75)

Lag(Change in Debt)

0.00
(0.44)

0.00
(0.43)

0.00
(0.47)

Lag(Liquid Ratio)

0.00
(0.49)

0.00
(0.52)

0.00
(0.56)

Post 2000

-0.01
(-1.91)

-0.01
(-1.86)

-0.01
(-0.64)

-0.01
(-1.17)

-0.01
(-1.16)

No

Yes

Yes

0.41

0.42

0.41

Type
Year Dummies
R

2

A variable that exhibits explanatory power in all the contemporaneous and IV specifications
is the natural logarithm of total book assets. Since the dependent variable is already scaled by
total book assets, this variable is not necessarily a proxy for the old standby of firm size. Instead,
ln(assets) may be a proxy for volatility. This seems reasonable given the negative relationship,
implying that highly volatile firms are more conservative with their dividend payout.
Alternatively, Fama and French (2002) argue ln(assets) may proxy for firm age and ease of
access to capital markets. If this is the case, I expect the relation to be positive since older firms
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are better known, thus, implying the ability to assess the capital markets more readily. Since the
correlation between dividends and total book assets is negative, I are more inclined to accept
ln(assets) as a measure of volatility.
With the exception of a dichotomous variable that accounts for a tax law change, the
remaining explanatory variables are not statistically significant. This is consistent with the
rationale that REITs mitigate agency and asymmetric information concerns. Additionally, the
finding that free cash flow is insignificant is contrary to the pecking order hypothesis of Myers
and Majluf (1984), which asserts that dividend payments are negatively affected by free cash
flows. Also notable is that the change in debt is not significant using contemporaneous or
instrumental variables, which is consistent with the Modigliani and Miller (1961) argument that
debt is irrelevant to dividends payouts.
Model 3 includes dummy variables for each year of the sample period. There is no statistical
impact on REIT dividend payouts in any of the individual years. However, the date that appears
to be an important determinant in models 1 and 2 is the date of tax law change that went into
effect on January 2001. Prior to this date, REITs were required to distribute 95 percent of their
taxable income. Subsequently, the distribution requirement reduced to 90 percent. This negative
coefficient on the dummy variable is consistent with the reduction in the required distribution.

3.3.3 Restricted Sample Based Upon REIT Type
Since Wang et al. (1993) find that REIT type is significant in three of the four sample years, I
next split the sample between equity and mortgage REITs. The results are in Table 16. Model 1
of the equity REITs uses GLS, while model 2 uses two-way random effects. The mortgage REIT
model uses GLS because there are not sufficient mortgage firm observations to compute twoway random effects or a GARCH model.
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Table 16: Results of GLS using IV to explain dividend payments of equity versus mortgage
REITs.
Explanatory Variable

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Intercept

0.04
(3.99)

0.04
(3.46)

0.04
(2.12

Earnings

0.87
(29.67)

0.82
(27.06)

0.04
(0.65)

Lag(Dividends)

0.05
(0.86)

0.23
(3.52)

0.80
(11.88)

Lag(Growth )

-0.00
(-0.04)

-0.00
(-0.19)

-0.00
(-0.16)

Lag(Tobin’s Q)

-0.00
(-0.16)

-0.01
(-1.19)

0.00
(0.24)

Lag(Slack)

0.02
(1.02)

0.02
(0.65)

0.01
(0.17)

Lag(Free Cash Flow)

-0.00
(-0.65)

-0.00
(0.46)

0.00
(0.51)

Lag(Ln(Assets))

-0.00
(-3.18)

-0.00
(-2.88)

-0.00
(-0.77)

Lag(Leverage)

0.00
(0.61)

0.01
(0.83)

-0.01
(-0.89)

Lag(Dispersion)

0.00
(0.33)

0.00
(0.39)

-0.00
(-0.05)

Lag(Change in Debt)

0.00
(0.27)

0.00
(0.13)

-0.00
(-0.47)

Lag (Liquid Ratio)

0.00
(0.27)

-0.00
(-0.03)

0.00
(3.94)

Lag (Asset Turnover)

-0.01
(-1.21)

-0.00
(-0.65)

-0.06
(-1.03)

Post 2000

-0.01
(-1.77)

-0.00
(-1.45)

-0.01
(-1.60)

0.41

0.42

R2
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The models examining the equity REITS are largely consistent with the full sample. The
proxies for agency costs and asymmetric information are statistically insignificant, and net
income and the natural logarithm of total firm assets continue to be determinants of REIT
dividend policy. The differences in the equity models compared to the full model come in the
significance of the level of dividends last period in model 1 and the dummy variable proxying for
the tax law change in model 2. The standard error is basically the same for lagged dividends
across both models. The difference between model 1 and 2 with respect to lagged dividends is
the coefficient estimate. A coefficient of 0.05 on lagged dividends in model 1 is about the same
magnitude of the standard error of 0.06, thus rendering the value statistically insignificant. I will
examine this finding more closely in the next subsection to ensure the result meets with our prior
intuition of dividend smoothing and target payouts.
The model for mortgage REITs seems to suffer from a small number of observations. The
biggest indicator of a problem is the insignificant value for net income. This result is
inconsistent with any of the empirical evidence using the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment
model, and our prior intuition. The high R2 and a dividend target payout of only 18 percent
based upon the Lintner (1956) model of Target Payout = Earnings/(1-Lagged Dividends) are
further evidence of model issues. An 18 percent target payout is not consistent with the REIT
requirement of a 90 percent dividend payout.

3.3.4 Dividend Smoothing
The unrestricted specification in the previous section demonstrates that contemporaneous
earnings, lagged dividends, firm volatility, the level of cash, and the REIT tax law change are
determinants of REIT dividend policy. I next examine in more detail the Lintner (1956) partial
adjustment model, which is a restricted specification utilizing only contemporaneous earnings
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and lagged dividends. The Lintner (1956) model gives us an understanding of REIT managers'
ability to manage dividends through smoothing.
In a survey, Lintner (1956) finds that managers believe that shareholders prefer a steady
stream of dividends, thus, firms tend to make periodic partial adjustments toward a target payout
ratio rather than dramatic changes to payout. This relation is reflected as
Di*,t = ri Ei ,t ,

(5)

where Di*,t is the target dividends for firm i in year t and ri is the firm's target ratio of dividends
to after-tax earnings. According to the model, firms do not move immediately to a new target
dividend, but instead smooth out changes in their dividends by moving part of the way to the
target dividend each year. This leads to the follow equation,
∆Di ,t = ai + ci ( Di*,t − Di ,t −1 ) + ui ,t ,

(6)

where ai is a constant, 0 < ci < 1 is a speed-of-adjustment (SOA) coefficient, and ui,t is a
normally distributed random error term. Substituting (5) into (6) yields

∆Di ,t = ai + ci ri Ei ,t − ci Di ,t −1 + ui ,t ,

(7)

which, in a multivariate regression setting leads to
∆Di ,t = αˆ i + βˆ1i Di ,t −1 + βˆ2i Ei ,t + uˆi ,t ,

(8)

where αˆ i = ai , βˆ1i = −ci , and βˆ2i = ci ri . Further, equation (7) can be rewritten as
Di ,t = αˆ i + βˆ1i Di ,t −1 + βˆ2i Ei ,t + uˆi ,t ,

(9)

where βˆ1i = 1 − c , without affecting parameter estimates or the error term. The SOA and target
payout ratio parameters provide a dividend smoothing measure because they are an indication of
the level of the change in dividends that occurs in the short run in response to a change in the
level of earnings. A higher value of c indicates a speedier adjustment or less smoothing.
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Going back to the unrestricted model from the previous section, I use the Lintner (1956)
model to initially examine dividend smoothing. Since the coefficients are same across the three
models, the IV specification yields a SOA coefficient of 1 minus 0.18 = 0.82. Because the SOA
ranges from total smoothing at zero and no smoothing at 1, the 0.82 factor indicates considerably
reduced smoothing by equity and mortgage REIT managers.
I also compute the SOA for the samples split by REIT type in Table 16. The equity REITs
demonstrate a SOA coefficient of 0.95 using GLS and 0.77 using two-way random effects. The
magnitude of the SOA factor indicates that REIT managers conduct minimal smoothing.
The Lintner (1956) model also provides coefficients of TP. The full IV model in Table 17
computes a TP of 0.85, which is slightly below the 90 percent requirement. The GLS (model 1)
specification in Table 14 produces a TP of 0.92, while the TP on model 2 is 1.06. The
magnitude of both of these coefficients is consistent with the REIT tax law requirement, and the
mean and median factors in Figure 6.
I next restrict the specification to the Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model –
contemporaneous earnings and lagged dividend. Table 17 details the findings. Panel A presents
the per share results, which is common practice for previous studies of the Lintner (1956) model.
Panel B accounts for heteroscedasticity, and Panel C controls for heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation.
Table 17: Restricted models using Lintner partial adjustment model to explain REIT dividend
policy.
Int

Et

Dt-1

N

TP

SOA

R2

Full Sample
t-statistic

0.44
15.76

0.27
21.31

0.54
29.89

1714

0.59

0.46

0.52

Equity REITs
t-statistic

0.33
15.95

0.21
20.63

0.66
43.43

1559

0.60

0.34

0.68

Panel A: DPS and EPS

table continued
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Mortgage REITs
t-statistic

0.68
3.84

0.35
6.52

0.42
6.15

155

0.60

0.59

0.39

Panel B: Scaled by Total Assets
Full Sample
t-statistic

0.01
5.15

0.60
25.10

0.38
13.59

1686

0.97

0.62

0.40

Equity REITs
t-statistic

0.01
4.46

0.71
26.98

0.29
9.72

1536

1.00

0.71

0.41

Panel C: Random Effects using Data Scaled by Total Assets
Full Sample
t-statistic

0.01
4.79

0.72
27.82

0.21
6.83

1686

0.90

0.79

0.35

Equity REITs
t-statistic

0.01
4.47

0.83
30.30

0.10
3.22

1539

0.92

0.90

0.39

For the full sample of REITs in Panel A, the SOA is 0.46 and the TP is 0.59. The SOA is
higher than the finding of 0.24 for REITs by Lee and Kau (1987). They also report earnings as
an unimportant variable in forecasting dividend payments, which is contrary to studies of the
Lintner (1956) model, and a TP of 0.50, which seems implausible given the 95 percent payout
requirement during the 1971 to 1976 sample period. The smoothing factor of 0.46 for the full
sample of equity and mortgage REITs is also higher than other studies of non-REIT firms.
Lintner's original paper finds a SOA coefficient of 0.30, Fama and Babiak (1968) find an average
of 0.37, Fama and French (2002) report a parameter of 0.33, and Brav et al. (2005) find a mean
of 0.33 for all Compustat firms with valid data from 1984-2002.
The REIT TP of 0.59 is higher than the average of 0.22 for U.S. corporate firms illustrated in
Figure 6. The TP is also higher than 0.33 result in Fama and French (2002), and the mean of
0.08 and median of 0.11 in Brav, et al. (2005). But while the TP is higher for REITs, the
magnitude is not as high as that exhibited in Figure 6 or the 90 or 95 percent (depending upon
the year of study) required by REIT tax law.
In addition to the full REIT sample, I execute the Lintner (1956) model on subsamples based
upon type of REIT, the results of which are also in Panel A. The findings of the equity REITs
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are more in line with the non-REIT studies mentioned above. The lower SOA of 0.34 for equity
REITs suggests that REIT managers conduct smoothing as much as other corporate firms.
Alternatively, the SOA of 0.59 for mortgage REITs suggests less smoothing in these REITs.
The Lintner (1956) model assumes the elements of the random error vector are uncorrelated
and have identical variances. However, Lagrange multiplier tests reject the hypothesis that the
regression disturbances using per share data have constant variances. Thus, I scale the dividends
in the restricted model by total book assets similar to the non-restricted specification. Scaling
dividends by total assets removes the heteroscedasticity based upon Lagrange tests.
When scaled by total assets, the SOA coefficients increase significantly and the TP levels are
consistent with the 90 percent payout requirement. The full sample SOA of 0.62 is almost twice
the level of the previously mentioned dividend smoothing studies of non-REIT firms. Further,
when REITs are broken into equity and mortgage REITs the equity REITs exhibit a higher SOA
coefficient of 0.71. The findings indicate REIT managers manage their dividends but not to the
extend of non-REIT managers.
Employing the Lintner (1956) model using data scaled by total assets helps remove
heteroscedasticity, however, the model also assumes that the elements of the random error vector
are uncorrelated across time. With the exception of Fama and French (2002), previous tests of
the Lintner (1956) model do not appear to address the bias in the standard errors across time.
Durbin (1970) tests for autocorrelation using dividends and earnings scaled by shares
outstanding and total assets reject the hypothesis of no serial correlation of the disturbances
across time periods. Hence, I next execute two-way random effects models following the
Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989) method for unbalanced panel data. Panel C of Table 17
illustrates the results.
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Similar to Panel B, the earnings coefficient in Panel C using random effects increases
significantly over the per share results. Because contemporaneous dividends are more sensitive
to contemporaneous earnings, the SOA coefficient of the random effects model is 0.79 for the
full model and 0.90 for the equity REIT subsample.6 The level of the SOA coefficient indicates
that REITs conduct minimal dividend smoothing. Also, consistent with tax law and the trend in
Figure 6 is the TP using random effects. The full sample has a TP equal to the legal requirement
of 90 percent and the equity REIT subsample is 0.92.
Overall, the Lintner (1956) model suggests that current earnings are much more important
than dividends paid last period in determining current dividend payouts. One caveat to this
general finding is that distinct patterns are easily noticeable in the raw data. The Lintner (1956)
model may not pick up the systematic pattern since REITs are required to meet the payout
requirement annually and yet most REITs pay a quarterly dividend. I examine quarterly
dividend smoothing using the Lintner (1956) specification but do not note a major difference in
the SOA coefficients to suggest more smoothing quarterly.

3.4 Chapter Summary
Although the 90 percent payout of taxable earnings by REITs initially appears to be quite
constraining, prior real estate research demonstrates that certain REITs possess flexibility in their
dividend payouts. Due to tax shields like depreciation, the gross cash flows of equity REITs, in
particular, are materially different than the 90 percent payout of taxable earnings. Hence, I find
that equity REITs are not strict residual policy firms, and that mortgage REITs follow a policy
more closely resembling a residual policy, but not all measures indicate a strict residual policy.

6

The mortgage REIT subsample does not produce valid results due to what appears to be a small number of
observations (i.e., 22 firms over 11 years). Net income is not statistically significant, the TP is 0.50, and adjusted
R2 is 0.74, and the time series variance is negative. All of these factors are out of line with our prior intuition, prior
research using the Lintner (1956) model, and current tax law.
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I examine the determinants of REIT dividend policy, correcting for econometric problems
that may cause problems with inferences in previous studies. I find that the two main
determinants of REIT dividend payments are contemporaneous earnings and the level of
dividends paid last period. These results are not surprising based on the numerous studies of the
Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model in the finance literature. However, both of these results
are different than existing literature on REIT dividend payouts.
I also find that the natural logarithm on total book assets and a tax law change are statistically
significant in explaining dividend payments. Since many variables in the unrestricted
specification are already scaled by total book assets to address heteroscedasticity, I argue that the
negative coefficient on the log of assets is a proxy for firm volatility. The dummy variable for
the tax law change denotes the change in required dividend payout from 95 to 90 percent.
Consistent with the arguments that REITs mitigate the market imperfections of agency costs
and asymmetric information, I do not find proxies for Tobin's Q, growth, leverage, ownership
dispersion, asset turnover, change in debt, or liquidity are significant determinants of REIT
dividend policy. These results do not support other studies of REIT dividend policy. Instead,
the findings promote REITs as a unique environment for testing of finance conundrums.
In the next chapter, I continue the examination of real estate investments that distribute
current income. I investigate the real estate mortgage, which is a primarily vehicle for investors
who desire quarterly payments. A major consideration of a mortgage investor is the prepayment
and default of the underlying investment. In the next section, I describe the affect of credit
scores on the prepayment and default options.
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4. Credit Scores
Statistically based credit decision-making systems were pioneered during the late 1950s, but only
saw mainstream use during the 1990s as the depth and breadth of electronic credit information
increased.7 These statistically based techniques are commonly referred to as credit scoring
models. Initially, scoring models were employed in the consumer-credit portfolios of most
major banks and credit card issuers to increase the speed of the credit decision, enhance the
uniformity of the decision process, and reduce the overall costs of decision making. More
recently, scoring models have migrated to other areas of the lending portfolio, particularly
mortgages. In fact, the use of credit scoring models has become widespread in the mortgagelending industry over the past 10 years. In addition to its use in the underwriting process,
secondary mortgage market purchasers employ credit scoring as a means of pricing risk. These
secondary purchasers include the government-sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, and private mortgage insurers.
Credit scoring is a significant factor in risk-based mortgage pricing since credit scores are a
key predictor of credit risk. Indeed, if a borrower has a low enough credit score, other
characteristics of the borrower and loan may not counteract the negative aspect of the credit
score and the loan will be denied. Yet, as important as credit scoring is to the mortgage loan
process, mortgage pricing models do not include credit scores as a stochastic state variable.
Instead, previous theoretical and empirical studies treat credit scores as a transaction cost.
But the treatment of credit scores, or more specifically, the change in credit scores, as a
transaction cost does not reflect the competing nature of credit scoring. On one hand, an increase
in a borrower's credit score implies that the interest rate of a future mortgage will be less if the
increase if enough to move into the next credit range. The higher credit rating increases the
7

See Lewis (1994), “An Introduction to Credit Scoring'”, for a history of credit scoring models.
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likelihood of a borrower to prepay the existing loan. And, assuming the borrower values the
increase in credit score, the likelihood of default will simultaneously decrease since the borrower
will have less propensity to harm the new, higher credit rating. On the other hand, it is well
established that the lower the credit score, the higher the rate of default. Simultaneously, a
decrease in credit rating will promote the borrower to maintain existing financing since new
financing will be more costly. This implies a decrease in the likelihood of prepayment.
Since the treatment of credit scores as a transaction cost does not reflect the true nature of the
variable, I examine whether the two existing state variables in the mortgage option pricing
model, house prices and interest rates, are sufficient to capture credit scores behavior. Using
Pearson correlations, I find that the relations between the change in credit scores and the change
in house prices and interest rates are not greater than the correlation between the two state
variables. The magnitude of the correlation between house prices and credit scores is 0.07,
between interest rates and credit scores is 0.16, and between house prices and interest rates is 0.10. Using univariate analysis I find that the change in credit scores is statistically significant in
explaining the change in house prices, however, the adjusted R2 of 0.01. Overall, house prices
and interest rates are not adequate as proxies for credit scores.
Because the current two state variable mortgage pricing model is not highly correlated with
credit score, I execute simulations using the pricing method of Hilliard et al. (1998) to determine
the impact of changes in credit scores on the price of a mortgage. Following the method of Kau
and Slawson (2002), I find a significant difference in the values of the mortgage asset from the
lender's perspective, and mortgage liability from the borrower's perspective when prepayment
and default vary simultaneously. The conclusion of the simulations is that changes in a
borrower's credit score have a significant impact on the pricing of a mortgage.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.1 summarizes credit scoring as
it applies to mortgage issuance. Section 4.2 discusses the theory and empirical findings of credit
rationing and its application to mortgage modeling. Section 4.3 describes the application of
credit scores to mortgage pricing utilizing option pricing theory. Section 4.4 discusses the credit
score data. Section 4.5 interacts credit scores with house prices and interest rates and simulates
credit scoring in the option pricing model. Section 4.6 considers the spatial characteristics of
credit scores. Section 4.7 summarizes this chapter.

4.1 Mortgage Credit Scoring
Credit scoring is widely used in mortgage origination. By one estimate, over 75 percent of all
home mortgage loan decisions use credit scores as a significant factor in the decision-making
process.8 Both the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal
National Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae) encourage mortgage lenders to use credit scoring.
In a letter dated July 1995 Freddie Mac promoted the use of credit scoring in loans submitted for
sale to the agency. In a similar letter dated October 1995, Fannie Mae reported it was depending
more on credit scoring for assessing risk.
Credit scoring utilizes data such as the applicant's outstanding debt and financial assets to
determine a composite number based upon individual rating in the five categories: payment
history (35 percent of the rating); length of credit history (15 percent); new credit (10 percent);
types of credit used (10 percent); and debt (30 percent). Income is not a factor. Some mortgage
models also use information about the property, such as real estate market conditions, and the
loan, e.g., the loan-to-value ratio (see DeZube (1996)). According to Fair, Isaac and Company,
Inc., a leading developer of scoring models, 50 to 60 variables might be considered when

8

Testimony of Chris Larsen (E-Loan) before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Banking and
Financial Services hearing on “Credit Score Disclosure.” (September 21, 2000).
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developing a typical model, but eight to twelve probably end up in the final scorecard as yielding
the predictive combination.
Regardless of the specific credit scoring system or specific variables utilized, the empirical
evidence indicates that credit scoring assists in the mortgage loan process. A study by Freddie
Mac found a high correlation between credit scores and loan performance on hundreds of
thousands of mortgage loans. Additionally, the agency found a strong correlation between the
underwriters' judgment and the Fair Isaac credit scores. Table 18 details statistics compiled by
the mortgage industry concerning the composite credit score and mortgage loan delinquency
ratios. Since lower credit scores result in a greater likelihood of delinquency, mortgage interest
rates demonstrate a negative relation with credit scores. As of April 2006, Fair Isaac reports that
a composite score between 760 and 850 will receive an interest rate of 6.13 percent, which is a
monthly payment of $1,313 on a $216,000, 30 year, fixed-rate mortgage. In comparison, a
borrower at the lower end of the spectrum, with a score between 620 and 639, with have an
interest rate of 7.72 percent, which is a payment of $1,543 on the same $216,000 loan.
Assuming the loan is kept to maturity, the difference in the total payment of the mortgage is
$84,742 based solely on the credit risk of the individual.
Table 18: Credit Scores and Mortgage Loan Delinquency Ratios.
Credit Score

Odds of Becoming
90 Days Delinquent
576:1
288:1
144:1
72:1
36:1
18:1
9:1
4:1
2:1

780
700
680
660
645
630
615
600
585
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Further empirical evidence in the real estate literature supports the use of credit scoring.
Avery et al.(1996) find that credit scores based on the credit history of mortgage applicants
generally are predictive of mortgage performance. The authors examine Equifax data for all
outstanding mortgages whose payments were current. For each loan type (I.e., conventional
fixed rate, conventional variable rate, or government-backed fixed rate) regardless of seasoning
status (newly originated or seasoned), borrowers with low scores had substantially higher
delinquency rates than those with medium or higher scores. They also examined data from
Freddie Mac on loans for single-family owner-occupied properties. Their findings indicate that
borrowers with low scores have higher foreclosure rates and that loans with both low credit
scores and higher loan-to-value ratios have particularly high foreclosure rates. In addition, credit
scores were much stronger predictors of foreclosure than was income.

4.2 Credit Rationing
The theory supporting the use of credit scoring in mortgage lending comes from credit rationing.
Lenders ration credit through down payments and other underwriting mechanisms as opposed to
allowing the loan rate clear the market. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argued that rationing by
qualification standards is the result of imperfect information about the uncertainty surrounding
the systematic credit risk of a loan application. They posit that moral hazard, adverse selection,
and asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers regarding credit risk can cause
equilibrium credit rationing. This can lead to lenders setting loan rates below market-clearing
levels. Such an outcome arises because information is costly and lenders have an imperfect
ability to classify borrowers according to default risk. Under such conditions, lenders price loans
based on the expected return on the loan portfolio rather than the expected return of the
individual loans. The expected return on the pool of loans, however, depends both on interest
earnings on loan payments and on expected default costs. Each of these factors increase with the
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loan rate. In the latter case, as the loan rate increases borrowers have an incentive to invest in
riskier projects (moral hazard) with higher expected returns. In addition, as loan rates rise,
prospective borrowers with strong aversions to default tend to drop out of the applicant pool first
(adverse selection), raising the average propensity to default of the remaining pool of borrowers.
Competitive lenders respond to such effects by setting interest rates lower than would occur in
the absence of moral hazard and adverse selection effects. Under such conditions, Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) show that it is possible that the competitive equilibrium will occur at below
market-clearing interest rates.
Duca and Rosenthal (1991) provide empirical support for this theory in the mortgage market.
Their model implies that lenders would not ration credit if they bore no default costs, suggesting
that government-insured mortgages, which protect lenders from default costs, should be
characterized by easier nonprice terms. Hence, the relative number of government-insured
obligations should increase in periods of increasing default risk, as lenders tighten nonprice
constraints on conventional loans. Duca and Rosenthal (1991) find that the FHA share of
originations increases during periods of tight credit as some credit-constrained households switch
from conventional to FHA financing. This is consistent with the theory since FHA loans are
available to all households, but are more expensive than conventional mortgages. Using
aggregate time-series data on mortgage originations and a default risk proxy, Duca and
Rosenthal (1991) find empirical support for this hypothesis. It should be noted that although
lenders typically require private mortgage insurance for loans with a down payment under 20
percent, mortgage insurers can deny insurance to applicants. Hence, mortgage insurance
companies in conjunction with lenders can be viewed as rationing credit. Consistent with this
view, foreclosure rates on conventional mortgages are generally much lower than those on FHA
and VA loans.
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4.3 Mortgage Pricing
Based on over twenty years of research, option theory has established itself as a foremost
approach to pricing mortgages. Using this approach, a mortgage can be viewed as two derivative
components: a prepayment call option and a default put option. At any time, a borrower can
prepay the mortgage balance and in effect call the debt obligation. Two common methods of
calling the mortgage are to sell the underlying real estate and to refinance the debt obligation.
Conversely, if the value of the house is “out-of-the-money”, the borrower can put the property
onto the mortgage holder. Complicating each of these options are features such as fixed- versus
adjustable-rate mortgages, prepayment penalties, multiple stochastic state variables and
transaction costs such as brokerage fees. Overall, mortgages are the topic of much finance and
real estate literature.

4.3.1 Default
In the mid-1980s, Foster and Van Order (1984 and 1985), Epperson, Kau, Keenan, and Muller
(1985), and Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) introduced the option-based model of default for
mortgage pricing. Foster and Van Order (1984) were the first to apply option theory formally to
the field of mortgage default by significantly extending the work of Campbell and Dietrich
(1983). They estimate loan-to-value ratios over time and use this information to create a number
of variables that represented the percentage of loans with negative equity for each year in the
study period.
In general, the Foster and Van-Order (1984) option-based model of default works quite well.
It explains over 90 percent of the variance using only equity variables. The authors find that
borrowers do not exercise the default option consistently or ``ruthlessly'', even with the
assumptions of zero transaction costs and with negative equity.
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Extending the work of Foster and Van Order are the studies by Epperson, et al. (1985) and
Vandell and Thibodeau (1985). Epperson and associates utilize partial differentiation equations
in a recursive model to examine default rate using simulated data. Vandell and Thibodeau
execute a binary logit model with the dependent variable indicating the probability of default. In
addition, Vandell and Thibodeau addressed the issues of transaction costs and crisis events.
Unlike previous studies, Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) also consider the market value of the
loan, as opposed to the book value, and use individual loan history data in their analysis. Lastly,
they also consider the role of expectation in the default decision by modeling expected home
values with a weighted index of backward-looking adaptive factors.
Overall, the theoretical premises by Foster and Van Order, Epperson and associates, and
Vandell and Thibodeau constitute the basis for the current state of theory. The examination of
the default decision as an option and the central role of net equity represent the dominant view in
more recent default studies. The three studies also provide evidence about the importance of
transaction costs and borrower-related factors such as expectations and occupation. Two realworld considerations are typically incorporated into contingent-claims mortgage termination
models. The first is transactions costs of default, and the second is ``trigger events'' or
exogenous termination such as job relocation.

4.3.1.1 Transaction Costs and Trigger Events
Default decisions incorporate transaction costs by adding a cost term to the outstanding balance
at the time of default. Transaction costs include monetary moving costs, the associated social
and family costs of a move, and financial disruption from a blemished credit standing or
deficiency judgments that claim other assets. Transaction costs are usually modeled as a fixed
dollar costs.
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The importance of transaction costs in default is controversial. Foster and Van Order (1984)
conclude that transaction costs must account for some of the results in their option based model
because borrowers do not behave``ruthlessly''. In general, the literature provides evidence
against ruthless behavior, suggesting that default costs play an important role in borrower
decisions.
Conversely, Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) developed an intertemporal optimization model of
the default decision and contended that a borrower defaults, not when the value of the equity
falls below the unpaid principal or the present value of the payments, but when it falls below the
value of the mortgage to the lender. Consistent with Epperson et al. (1985), the authors show that
this value includes both the value of exercising the option now and the value of terminating the
option in the future. Using simulation analysis, the authors find support for their model. They
demonstrate that the value of the house must fall by substantially more than the value of the
mortgage's termination option at the point of zero equity before it is in fact rational for a
borrower to default. The authors conclude that the amounts involved can be mistaken for
transaction costs when in reality transaction costs play little or no role in the default decision.
Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1994) point out that the default option is exercised only when house
prices are well below the mortgage balance even if transaction costs are negligible. Lekkas,
Quigley, and Van Order (1993) and Quigley and Van Order (1995) find differences in loan loss
severity and reject the hypothesis that transaction costs do not matter.
In the context of an option pricing model, trigger events affect the optimal default decision
by converting what is normally a multi-period optimization into a single period decision.
Clauretie (1987) finds that the change in the unemployment rate is important. Quigley, Van
Order and Deng (1994) find divorce explains higher default rates, but get mixed results regarding
unemployment. Thomson (1994) finds both divorce and unemployment significant.
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Overall, Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1997) find transaction costs and trigger events
are important to the default option. Additionally, Brueckner (2000) builds on the empirical
literature designed to test the ruthless-default principle from option-based models of mortgage
pricing. Brueckner (2000) takes a further step by arguing that such costs are private information.
He adds asymmetric information between the borrower and lender to the transactions costs
associated with default.

4.3.1.2 Insurance and Guarantees Against Default
If the occurrence of default can be calculated, it is no great feat to calculate values of insurance
or guarantees against default. Cunningham and Hendershott (1984), Kau et al. (1990a, 1992,
1993), Kau, Keenan, and Muller (1993), and Schwartz and Torous (1992) consider this issue.
There are two obvious ways to treat insurance: as an upfront lump sum payment or as part of the
contract rate that determines monthly payments. Kau et al. (1992, 1993) take the former
approach, though they note that the latter approach is included in their work, since obtaining the
contract rate that balances the contract without insurance also encompasses the latter situation
because the contract rate remains the same whether the lender chooses to purchase insurance or
not.

4.3.2 Prepayment
There are two distinct classes of prepayment. The first type, endogenous payment, occurs as a
result of the borrower's minimizing the market value of the loan (the market cost to the
borrower). This financial prepayment is independent of the borrower's individual characteristics,
and, in the absence of credit risk, depends only on the term structure. Such prepayment is
generated in the contingent-claims models. The second type of prepayment occurs for extraneous
reasons and does not minimize the objective cost of the mortgage. The motivation for such
prepayment arises from the personal circumstances of the borrower, and, most commonly,
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involves the sale of a house with a non-assumable mortgage for such reasons as job relocation or
change in family size.
Some of the earliest work on mortgage prepayment began with Dunn and McConnell (1981a,
1981b), Buser and Hendershott (1984), Brennan and Schwartz (1985), and Hall (1985). Dunn
and McConnell (1981a, 1981b) are the first to apply the backward-solving model to fixed-rate
default-free mortgages. They illustrate how the method developed by Brennan and Schwartz
(1977) for nonamortizing bonds can be applied to the amortizing 30-year mortgages, and show
the general implication of amortization. Buser and Hendershott (1984) examined the sensitivity
of the simulated call values to the assumed parameters and valued 15-year level-payment
mortgages and 30-year graduated-payment mortgages, as well as the standard 30-year levelpayment mortgages. The pioneers of the application of numerical methods to the pricing of debt
instruments, Brennan and Schwartz in 1985 turn their attention to pricing fixed-rate mortgages.
They employed a two-state interest-rate model, which they contend leads to substantially more
accurate pricing.
Dunn and McConnell (1981) build off Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1980), while Brennan and
Schwartz (1985) work on Variable Rate Loan Contracts and the determinants of GNMA
Mortgage Prices. Dunn and McConnell (1981b) introduces prepayment model into the
contingent-claim framework as an external source of prepayments. The simplest means of doing
this is to regard exogenous prepayments as an additional Poisson process, whose mean rate of
arrival is then determined by the external prepayment model. Brennan and Schwartz (1985)
follow this research method of introducing random prepayments as Poisson processes.
Cassidy (1983) and Dietrich et al. (1983) estimated the value of a partial offset to the call
option - the forced prepayment of the mortgage when the house is sold. Cassidy (1983), using
Monte Carlo simulation, computed the option to be worth 30 to 80 basis points. Dietrich et al.,
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solving the partial differential equation backwards, reported somewhat higher estimates, 50 to
100 basis points.
Others, in addition to Brennan and Schwartz (1985) work with a two-state term structure.
Schwartz and Torous (1989a, 1989b, 1991), Dale-Johnson and Langetieg (1986), and Dietrich
and associates (1983) model fixed-rate mortgage. The advantage of the two-state process is that
it provides more degrees of freedom in describing the actual term structure. The disadvantage is
that it requires many more calculations to achieve a solution. Buser, Hendershott, and Sanders
(1990) compare the one-state and two-state interest processes in the context of a mortgage and
find the one-state form adequate. Conversely, Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) find one-state
interest rate processes to be deficient in estimating the term structure. Schwartz and Torous
(1992) examine prepayment and default but revert to a single state description of interest rates.
One motivation for ignoring the role of default, and hence the houseprocess, is to free up
computational power for simulating richer term structures.

4.3.3 Combining Default and Prepayment
The more recent advancements in the option-pricing approach to mortgage valuation combine
default and prepayment into the same model. Since prepayment and default substitute for one
another, contracts with only one of the default or prepayment provisions lead the borrowers to
behave differently than when both are present. This substitution effect means that one cannot
accurately value either the individual provisions or their interaction without modeling both
options. Thus, solution of the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985b) model must include the
borrower's two options to terminate before maturity. The prepayment option is American in
style, with an inherent free boundary, and the default option is of compound European style (i.e.,
it is actually a series of options).
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Seminal work on mortgage option pricing by Kau et al. (1992 and 1994) value a fixed-rate
mortgage and its embedded option to default and prepay by adapting a two-state explicit finitedifference technique. The two-factor version of the option pricing model is based upon the value
of the house, H, and the spot rate of interest, r. The term structure is from Cox et al. (1985),
which is written as
dr = γ (Θ − r )dt + σ r rdzr ,

(10)

where the spot rate of interest, r, drives the entire term structure, Θ is the long term mean rate of
interest, γ is the speed of adjustment to the mean, σ r is the standard deviation of the short rate,
and dzr is a Weiner process.9

The value of the house, H, is assumed to follow the Ito process

dH
= (α − s )dt + σ H dz H ,
H

(11)

where α is the long-term mean growth rate of the house, s is the service flow, σ H is the standard
deviation of the value of the real estate, and dz H is a Weiner process. Using risk neutrality
arguments, H becomes
dHˆ
= (r − s )dt + σ H dz H .
Hˆ

(12)

Kau et al. (1992) show that under the perfect-capital-market assumption and the local
expectations hypothesis that the partial differential equation is
1 2 2 ∂2F
∂2F 1 2 ∂2 F
∂2 F
∂F ∂ 2 F
H v
+ ρ H rvσ
+ rσ
+ κ (Θ − r )
+ (r − δ ) H
+
= rF , (13)
2
∂H 2
∂H ∂r 2
∂r 2
∂r
∂H
∂t

9

The equations and notation in this section are standard to those presented by Kau et al. (1992), Hilliard, Kau, and
Slawson (1998), and Kau and Slawson (2002).
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where ρ is the correlation coefficient between dzr and dz H . Standard arguments in finance
allow us to write this process relating the asset value, F(r,H,t) to the state variables house price,
H, and spot interest rate, r.

4.3.4 Competing Risks
A significant amount of work has been completed recently within a competing risk framework.
The proportional hazard model introduced by Cox and Oakes (1984) provides a framework for
considering the exercise of options empirically and the importance of other trigger events in
mortgage terminations. As described in Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000), the approach
estimates the competing risks simultaneously, and accounts for the fact that risks may be
correlated.10 The competing risks model for mortgage prepayment and default is similar to the
context of corporate finance and contingent claims literature with borrowers viewed as
equityholders and lenders as debtholders. Ultimately, the log likelihood function of the
competing risk model is given by
N

log L = ∑ δ pi log( Fp ( K i )) + δ ui log(( Fu ( K i )) + δ ci log(( Fc ( K i )) ,
i =1

where δ ji , j = p, d , u , c are indicator variables that take the value of one if the ith loan is
terminated by prepayment, default, unknown type, or censoring, respectively, and take a value of
zero otherwise.
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (1996) utilize the competing risks model when analyzing a
sample of low-down payment mortgages that default. In this model, prepayment and default are
considered interdependent competing risks. Further, Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000)
model default and prepayment as dependent competing risks to effectively examine the joint
nature of the put and call options. Strong support is found to suggest that the value of the put
10

Deng, Quigley, and Van Order follow the econometric process given by Han and Hausman (1990), Sueyoshi
(1992), and McCall (1996).
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(call) has a significant effect on the call (put) risk. The discrete specification of unobserved
heterogeneity allows borrowers to be differentiated into groups based on relative riskiness. In
terms of prepayment, the high-risk group is found to be approximately three times riskier than
the intermediate group and twenty times riskier than the low risk group. For default, however,
borrowers are found to be rather homogeneous. This is partly due to the fact that defaults on
residential mortgages are rare events because of incomplete separation of investment and
consumption decision in housing as well as the high costs of default on personal credit. The
authors attribute the significance in exercising mortgage options or differences in borrowers'
sophistication in exercising mortgage options or differences in levels of unobserved transaction
costs. However, unobserved heterogeneity may also capture the measurement errors in option
values and observable transaction costs.
Clapp, et al. (2001) model competing risks of mortgage termination where the borrower faces
a repeated choice to continue to pay, refinance the loan, move or default. Most previous
empirical work on mortgage prepayment ignores the distinction between prepayments triggered
by refinancing and moving, combining them into a single prepayment rate. They show that
financial considerations are the primary drivers of the refinance choice while homeowner
characteristics have more influence on the move decision.

4.4 Credit Scoring Data
4.4.1 Credit Scores
To examine the impact of the competing transaction costs of changes in credit score related to
mortgage pricing, I use proprietary data from TransUnion, a provider of credit scoring services.
TransUnion provides de-personalized aggregated time series credit information, from which this
chapter utilizes the median aggregate credit score for each state in the contiguous U.S. plus
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Washington D.C. The data spans the fourth quarter of 1998 to the first quarter of 2004, resulting
in 1078 state-quarter observations.
Table 19 details the summary statistics of the data. As might be expected, credit scores are
autocorrelated. Therefore, I use the change in credit scores to compute the findings of this study.
I examine autocorrelation for up to five quarterly periods to ensure that seasonal periods do not
affect the results. I find that the autocorrelation is of degree AR(1), thus using changes is
sufficient. As a robustness check of our results, I use the raw numerical change in the credit
scores as well as a percentage change. Table 19 refers to these variables as CS-RChange for raw
numerical change and CS-PChange for percentage change.
Table 19: Credit scoring summary statistics.
Variables

N

Mean

Standard Median Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Credit Score 1078 687.740
32.098
690.000 599.000
745.000
CS-RChange 1029 -0.017
5.187
0.000
-27.000
24.000
CS-PChange 1029 -0.000
0.008
0.000
-0.038
0.035
House Price 1078 248.125
67.291
235.450 139.480
616.300
HP-RChange 1029 4.002
3.600
2.900
-2.930
28.880
HP-PChange 1029 0.015
0.010
0.013
-1.012
0.068
Interest Rate
22
6.894
0.848
6.923
5.507
8.320
IR-RChange
21
-0.055
0.324
-0.150
-0.633
0.590
IR-PChange
21
-0.008
0.048
-0.022
-0.083
0.092

4.4.2 Other State Variables
One of the objectives of this chapter is to examine the impact of credit scores on house prices.
Therefore, I obtain quarterly house prices from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) for each state. The index is based upon the first quarter of 1980 equal to
100. Therefore, as seen in Table 19, the average house price has appreciated approximately 2.48
times from the first quarter of 1980 to first quarter of 2004. Table 19 also provides the numerical
75

(HP-RChange) and percentage (HP-PChange) changes in house prices.
Another objective of this essay is to examine the impact of credit scores on interest rates and
vice versa. I use interest rates from Freddie Mac fixed-rate 30-year conventional mortgages.
Again, I use the numerical and percentage changes for computations. Table 19 details the
summary statistics for the interest rates measures.

4.5 Modeling Credit Scores in Mortgage Pricing
Whether through the use of an option pricing model (OPM) or competing risks model, mortgages
are priced considering the two embedded options of default and prepay by adapting a two-state
explicit finite-difference technique. Kau and Slawson(2002) discuss the fact that the contingent
claims and competing risk models answer the question of mortgage pricing from two directions.
Whereas, the competing risk models address the empirical data to find the correct pricing model,
option pricing models (OPMs) attempt to build the correct model through the correct usage of
economic inputs. One of the major sticking points seems to be that mortgage borrowers are
more heterogeneous than is allowed by OPMs. However, theoretical OPMs can accommodate
borrower heterogeneity, and can simulate the value implications of non-financial decisions while
preserving financial decisions. Hence, I leverage off the work of Kau and Slawson (2002) and
Hilliard, Kau, and Slawson(1998). These papers show that the OPM can be crafted such that
heterogeneities can be modeled and the appropriate mortgage price can be obtained.
In addressing a mortgage borrower's heterogeneity, the foremost topic emphasized is
transactions costs associated with either default or prepayment. A list of transactions costs
include: the time and effort expended in searching, pricing, and evaluating alternative properties;
real estate brokerage fees; mortgage broker or banker fees, such as discount points; appraisal
costs; attorney fees; prepayment penalties; moving costs; and loss of reputation associated with
the decline of a borrower's credit score. Analysis of these transactions costs yields one important
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distinction that is not addressed in previous studies, namely, that credit scores are unique in that
they affect both prepayment and default simultaneously.
The other transaction costs do not appear to be competing. If the time and effort expending
in searching, pricing, and evaluating alternative properties increases(decreases), a mortgage
borrower will have an decreased(increased) likelihood of prepaying the mortgage, all else equal.
Similarly, if brokerage fees, mortgage banker fees, appraisal costs, attorney fees, and moving
costs increase(decrease), a borrower experiences a decrease(increase) in incentive to prepay the
existing mortgage because the transactions costs of purchasing a new property and moving have
risen(declined).
In contrast to these other transaction costs, any change in a borrower's credit rating affects the
price of a mortgage on both the prepayment and default options. On one hand, an increase in a
borrower's credit score implies that the interest rate of a future mortgage will be less, which
increases the likelihood of a borrower to prepay the existing loan. And, assuming the borrower
values the increase in credit score, the likelihood of default will simultaneously decrease since
the borrower will have less propensity to harm the new, higher credit rating. On the other hand,
it is well established that the lower the credit score, the higher the rate of default.
Simultaneously, a decrease in credit rating will cause the borrower to maintain existing financing
since new financing will be more costly. This implies a decrease in the likelihood of
prepayment.

4.5.1 Correlations
As a precursor to what could potentially be a three-state explicit finite-difference model, I initial
examine the correlations between the three state variables. Table 20 details the correlations of
the two types of changes (numerical and percentage) of the state variables. The results are
consistent for both types.
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Table 20: Pearson correlation coefficients of changes in credit scores, house prices, and interest
rates.

CS-RChange
CS-PChange
HP-RChange
HP-PChange
IR-RChange
IR-PChange

CSRChange
1.000
0.999
0.066
0.091
0.164
0.155

CSPChange

HPRChange

HPPChange

IRRChange

IRPChange

1.000
0.065
0.090
0.168
0.160

1.000
0.930
-0.106
-0.096

1.000
-0.117
-0.101

1.000
0.992

1.000

The results for credit scores and house prices in the first and second column indicate
correlations between 0.065 and 0.091. While all the correlations in Table 20 are significant at
the 5 percent level, the lower level of correlation implies that house prices do not alone address
the increasing importance of credit scores.
The same can be said concerning the interaction of credit scores and interest rates. The
correlation is within the range of 0.155 to 0.168. Again, the correlation is significant, but is not
nearly high enough to discount the use of credit score in an OPM.
The last item of note on Table 20 is the correlation between interest rates and house prices.
The range is between -0.117 and -0.096. This is similar to the magnitude of the correlation
between credit scores and the other two state variables. Hence, following the history of
including house prices and interest rates in the OPM, the correlation results do not preclude
credit scores from inclusion in the OPM.

4.5.2 Regressions
I also examine the interaction among house prices, credit scores, and interest rates by using
ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress combinations of the numerical and percentage changes of
credit scores and interest rates on the percentage change in house prices. Table 21 details the
findings. The results demonstrate that changes in credit scores are a statistically significant
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explanatory variable, both alone and in concert with changes in interest rates, the coefficient of
determination is rather low.
Table 21 OLS regression models to examine house price changes using changes in credit scores.
Variable
Intercept
CS-PChange

(1)
0.02
(47.71)
0.12
(2.90)

CS-RChange

(2)
0.02
(47.72)

(3)
0.01
(46.76)
0.15
(3.49)

0.00
(2.94)

IR-PChange

-0.03
(-3.78)

IR-RChange
Adjusted R2

(4)
0.01
(46.69)
0.15
(3.62)

-0.00
(-4.34)
0.01

0.01

0.02

0.03

To confirm these results, I compute additional OLS models using various combinations of
credit scores and interest rates as well as some well-known explanatory variables of house prices.
The models in Table 22 control for median household income(Income), the state population over
16 that is employed(Employment), the percentage of population with a college degree or
higher(College), the average number of rooms in a home(Rooms), the average age of a
home(AGE), and the proportion of the population that is under age 16 (YOUNG) and over
65(OLDER). The inclusion of these variables does not change the magnitude of the coefficients
on credit scores and interest rates, but does reduce the standard error, thus increasing the {\it t}statistics. Additionally, the coefficient of the intercept is dramatically reduced, and the
coefficient of determination increases materially.
Table 22: OLS regression models to explain house prices using credit scores and other hedonic
variables.
Variable

(1)

(2)
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(3)
(4)
table continued

Intercept
CS-PChange

0.04
(0.42)
0.14
(4.11)

CS-RChange

0.04
(0.43)

0.00
(4.19)

IR-PChange
IR-RChange

0.04
(0.42)
0.14
(3.95)

0.04
(0.42)

-0.03
(-4.52)

0.00
(4.03)
-0.03
(-4.52)

-0.00
(-5.19)
0.00
(7.11)
-0.00
(-0.82)
0.00
(4.89)
-0.01
(-6.20)

-0.00
(-5.19)
0.00
(7.12)
-0.00
(-0.82)
0.00
(4.89)
-0.01
(-6.20)

0.00
(7.09)
-0.00
(-0.81)
0.00
(4.88)
-0.01
(-6.17)

0.00
(7.10)
-0.00
(-0.81)
0.00
(4.88)
-0.01
(-6.18)

Age

-0.00
(-0.22)

-0.00
(-0.22)

-0.00
(-0.22)

-0.00
(-0.22)

Young

-0.03
(-2.22)

-0.03
(-2.23)

-0.03
(-2.22)

-0.03
(-2.22)

Older

0.06
(3.48)
0.33

0.06
(3.48)
0.33

0.06
(3.47)
0.33

0.06
(3.47)
0.33

Income
Employment
College
Rooms

Adjusted R2

4.5.3 Simulations
To see how the competing transaction cost affect mortgage prices, I simulate results using the
pricing method of Hilliard et al. (1998). Their model approximates the prepayment and default
option values in the event of frictions, such as transaction costs. The method is a backwardspricing numerical procedure based upon the multivariate binomial option pricing technique in
Nelson and Ramaswamy (1990). Hilliard et al. (1998) utilize the method of Nelson and
Ramaswamy (1990) to create a computationally simple bivariate binomial tree of house prices
and interest rates. After accounting for the various boundary conditions imposed by the
borrower who acts to minimize the mortgage liability in the face of frictions at each decision
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point in the tree, the technique approximates the option values, f, in the partial differential
equation in equation (13). The option value are then used in the mortgage valuation

Vt ,r , H = RPt ,r − Cr ,t , H − Pt ,r , H ,
where RPt ,r is the value of the remaining payments at time t given the level of r, Cr ,t , H is the
prepayment(call) option value at time t given r and H, and Pt ,r , H is the default(put) option value
at time t given r and H.
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Figure 7: Kau and Slawson (2002) simulation results.
To begin the simulation I create the base case of Kau and Slawson (2002). The parameters of
the Cox et al. (1985) interest rate process in equation (10) are r0 =10 percent, σ r =10 percent,
Θ = 15 percent, and γ =25 percent. The house price parameters in equation (12) are σ H =15

percent and s = 8.5 percent. In addition, the loan-to-value ratio at origination is 80 percent and
the contract rate is 12 percent. Using these parameters yields Figure 7. The initial value of the
81

mortgage, Vt ,r , H , is equal to 0.98546, which means that for a $100,000 home with an $80,000
mortgage, the initial value of the mortgage given the prepayment and default option equals
78,836.80.
Kau and Slawson (2002) compute the values shown in Figure 7 for various values of
Variable Transaction Costs of Optimal Default. In their study, the authors argue that an OPM
can allow for any transaction costs and simulate their inclusion as shown in Figure 7. In their
friction example, generic transaction costs increase in an optimal manner for default. They show
that when transaction costs are between 0 percent and 12 percent, the put option of the liability is
always greater than the put option on the asset.
Using the Kau and Slawson (2002) model, I simulate the competing transaction cost of credit
scores. I begin with a base case using some of the same parameters as in Figure 7 - r0 =10
percent, σ r =10 percent, Θ = 15 percent, γ =25 percent, σ H =15 percent, s = 8.5 percent., loan-tovalue ratio at origination is 80 percent, and the contract rate is 12 percent. Instead of modeling
optimal default only, I allow prepayment and default to vary simultaneously. Figure 8 shows the
results. The mortgage asset findings represent the lender's perspective, and the mortgage liability
results represent the borrower's perspective.
The Kau and Slawson (2002) base case begins at the 4 percent mark. The value of the
liability is 1.01562 while the value of the asset is 0.98672. These values equate to $81,249.60
and $78,937.60 for the example of an $80,000 mortgage. As a borrower's credit score increases,
the transaction cost of prepayment decreases, which is the x-axis. Under this simulation,
prepayment costs decrease to 3 percent, while costs associated with default increase to 6 percent.
The resulting value of the liability is 1.00987 and the asset is 0.98628. Further values are
computed for 2 percent prepayment costs with 7 percent default costs and 1 percent prepayment
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costs and 8 percent default costs. The results indicate that the value of the liability is always
greater than the value of the asset.
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Figure 8: The effect of increasing credit scores on the lender's mortgage asset and the borrower's
mortgage liability

To examine the affects of decreasing credit scores, I re-executed the Kau and Slawson (2002)
model, beginning with the base case and raising prepayment costs from 4 percent to 5, 6, 7, and 8
percent. The comparable default costs begin at 5 percent and reduce from 4 to 1 percent. Figure
9 displays the results of the simulation. Again, the base case of 4 percent prepayment and 5
percent default yields a liability value of 1.01562. This amount increases to 1.02074 for 5
percent and continues to increase up to 1.03242 for 8 percent prepayment costs with 1 percent
default costs. The associated asset value begins at .98672 and increases to 0.99348.
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Figure 9: The effect of decreasing credit scores on the lender's mortgage asset and the borrower's
mortgage liability.
The simulations demonstrate that when transaction costs associated with the prepayment and
options vary simultaneously, the price of a mortgage changes for both the lender and borrower.
A question arises as to the correct method to account for the change. One method may be to
incorporate the competing transaction cost into the existing mortgage OPM. However, given the
importance of credit scoring to the mortgage industry, it seems that the best method is to
incorporate credit scoring as an additional state variable.

4.6 Spatial Considerations
To incorporate credit scoring as a state variable in the mortgage OPM, one must understand the
behavior of credit scores. While this exercise is not within the scope of this essay, I include one
aspect of credit score behavior that should be included in any modeling. Namely, credit scores
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are not only correlated across time, but across space. Using just the median credit score of each
state in the continental U.S., Figure 10 details how credit scores cluster into regions.

Figure 10: Quartile credit score by state.

Little is written in the literature regarding the spatial aspect of credit scores. Searches on
JSTOR, Lexis-Nexis, EBSCO did not yield one referred journal article on the topic. The only
reference to the spatial considerations of credit scores is from Avery et al (2000), who examine
the determinants of credit scores, and include nine Census regions. They find that six of the
regions are statistically significant, which is consistent with Figure 10. In the figure, white is the
lowest quartile, infrequent dots the second quartile, heavy gridding is the third, and dark gray is
the highest quartile.
To assess the significance of spatial correlation, I use the generalized least squares (GLS)
model, defined as Y = X β + U , where U is a zero-mean vector of errors with variance-covariance
matrix C such that E(U)=0 and E(UUT)=C.
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As described by Bailey and Gatrell (1995), the GLS model is specified interactively through
relationships between explanatory variables and their neighboring values. One simple variate
interaction model is

Y = X β +U

U = ρWU + ε
where ε is a vector of independent random errors with constant variance σ 2 and W is a
proximity matrix. This model is an example of a spatial autoregressive model (SAR), in this
case with just one interaction parameter ρ . The model is

Y = X β + ρWU + ε

= X β + ρW (Y − X β ) + ε

= X β + ρWY − ρWXB + ε
Hence, Y is expressed as a response to several influences; Yi in state area Ai depends on the
surrounding value for Y j ( j ≠ i ) , through the term ρWY ; it also depends on the general trend
through X β ; and on neighboring trend values through ρWX β .
Table 23 details the coefficients and signed root deviances. The signed root deviances can be
interpreted as t-statistics. The SAR model finds that with credit scores as the dependent variable,
holding a college or higher degree, the number of rooms in a home, the proportion of the
population over age 65, and space, as denoted by ρ , are statistically significant. While modeling
credit scores in the mortgage OPM requires extensive work, Table 23 demonstrates that the
spatial correlation of credit ratings must be included as part of the modeled behavior.
Table 23: Spatial-temporal models of credit scores.
Variables
Intercept
Income

Beta Estimates
11.5792
0.0398

Signed Root Deviances
1.5816
-1.1459
86

PR of Higher SRDS
0.1137
0.2518
table continued

Employment
College
Rooms
Age
Young
Older
Population

ρ

0.1698
0.0826
0.2267
0.7775
0.0663
0.1597
0.0062
0.8460

1.7839
3.5476
3.9311
0.7973
-1.6011
4.5197
1.9664
5.7548

0.0744
0.0004
0.0001
0.4253
0.1094
0.0000
0.0493
0.0000

4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter examines credit scores and their application to mortgage pricing. Over the past 10
years credit scores have become a fundamental part of the mortgage origination process. In
addition to its use in the underwriting process, secondary mortgage market purchasers employ
credit scoring as a means of pricing risk.
Current models of mortgage pricing model credit scores as a transaction cost that is either
increasing or decreasing, but not both. However, a change in credit scores effects both the
prepayment and default option of a mortgage simultaneously. If a borrower's credit score
increases, the transaction costs associated with the prepayment option will decrease, and the
transaction costs associated with default will increase. Alternatively, if a borrower's credit rating
decreases, the prepayment transaction costs increase, while the default costs will decrease.
Simulations in this chapter find that when competing transaction costs are allowed to vary, the
price of a mortgage significantly changes.
Instead of treating credit scores as a competing transaction cost, the better treatment is to add
credit scores as a stochastic state variable in a contingent claim model. This is especially true
given the increasing importance of creditworthiness in loan origination and the secondary
mortgage market. The results in this essay demonstrate that credit scores are not highly
correlated with house prices and interest rates, thus, there inclusion will make for a better
mortgage pricing model.
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5. Conclusion
The findings from this dissertation present new understanding to the field of real estate. Due to
heterogeneity and immobility, the results demonstrate a concern for large-scale real estate
portfolios like the type used by pension funds and insurance firms. For large-scale real estate
investments, REITs, used by individuals to generate income, the findings shed new light on the
determinants of dividend policy, and market imperfections inherent to REITs. Finally, for real
estate investors who prefer mortgage income, the results demonstrate a need to include credit
scores in the mortgage pricing models.
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